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of the Canadian Cabinet

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THE STRUCTURE AND MEMBERSHIP  
OF THE CANADIAN CABINET

Internal Research Project of the  
Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism

Richard VanLoon  
October 1966







## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER I	
✓ The Evolution and Function of Cabinet Government in Canada	11
CHAPTER II	
The Provincial and Ethnic Distribution of Cabinet Ministers	31
Provincial Determinants	31
Ethnic Distribution of Portfolios..	56
CHAPTER III	
The Social Background of Cabinet Ministers	60
Educational Backgrounds of Cabinet Ministers	61
(i) General Levels	61
(ii) Pre-University Education	65
(iii) University Training	70
The Religions of Cabinet Ministers	77
Occupational Backgrounds of Cabinet Ministers	87
Miscellaneous Social Factors	98
Conclusions	100

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Page

CHAPTER IV

The Political Careers of Cabinet Ministers	104
The Pre-Cabinet Career Patterns	104
(i) Parliamentary	104
(ii) Outside of Federal Parliament	110
The Ages and Length of Time in Cabinet of Cabinet Ministers	117
Post-Cabinet Political Careers	122

CHAPTER V

A Survey of the Formation of Several Cabinets	131
---	-----

CHAPTER VI

Conclusions	160
-------------	-----

TABLE APPENDICES 1 TO 21	160 to 187
--------------------------	------------

APPENDIX B

Sources and Statistical Methods	188
---------------------------------	-----

STANDARD BIOGRAPHICAL SOURCES USED	193
------------------------------------	-----





... Supposing the present Government to be overthrown. The choice in the formation of a new ministry would lie between Coodle and Sir Thomas Doodle - supposing it to be impossible for Foodle to act with Yeudle which may be assumed to be the case in consequence of the breach arising out of that affair with Heudle. Then giving the Secretary of State and the leadership of the House of Commons to Foodle, Finance to Koodle, Justice to Teudle and External Affairs to Meudle what are you to do with Noodle. You can't offer him the Presidency of the Council; that is reserved for Peudle. You can't put him in Forestry; that is hardly good enough for Quoodle. What follows? That the country is shipwrecked, lost, gone to monocultural pieces..."

quoted with apologies for  
Canadianization from Dicken's Bleak House





# THE STRUCTURE AND MEMBERSHIP OF THE CANADIAN CABINET

## INTRODUCTION

"A cabinet is a combining committee - a hyphen which joins, a buckle which fastens the legislative part of the state to the executive part of the state".<sup>1</sup> So wrote Walter Bagehot in what has become one of the most popular clichés in the study of Parliamentary government. Nevertheless it is true for Canada and in more ways than he could have known. For in Canada not only does the Cabinet link the legislative and executive portions of government but, perhaps even more importantly, it performs the function of cementing the highest level of the political elite from two distinct cultures, from five regions and from ten provinces. The federal structure of government and the pluralistic and multi-cultural nature of society in Canada have established conditions which make the Cabinet an almost unique political creation dedicated not only to the implementation of political programs but as well to the binding together of Canadian political society.

What are the qualifications of the men who are to serve in this very special body? That is the main problem of this

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<sup>1</sup> Walter Bagehot, The English Constitution, p. 12.





inquiry. Where do they come from, what are their social backgrounds, their political careers, their contacts with society, their occupations, their education? What sets them apart from the rest of society or, indeed, from the rest of the Parliament from which they are chosen? How are their numbers apportioned according to ethnicity or territorial origin and how are portfolios apportioned among them once their numbers have been chosen? What differences can be discerned between members representative of each of our two major cultural groupings and what are these differences likely to mean inside the cabinet room? How have they changed over time and what might be expected to happen to this group of men in the future?

All these questions and more are posed and answered as far as possible in the following pages. Throughout, the main emphasis will be on the examination of the cabinet as a mechanism of accommodation -- as a means of holding together the uppermost level of Canadian political life in order to produce viable solutions to many of our most vital political problems.

The concern here is, for the most part, directly with the men involved in the cabinet rather than with the action of the cabinet in the day-to-day running of the country.





All of the above questions boil down to the simple one of who were they? For by answering this we will, to some extent, determine if and how the cabinet has been used as an instrument of accommodation and hence have shed some light on its functioning in a culturally heterogeneous federation. The cabinet is a body ruled more by custom than by law and it involves the frequent meeting together of a reasonably small body of men in a face-to-face relationship for the solution of problems. Thus the men who operate it come to be as vital as the institution itself. It is by knowing them that we can better understand the body and hence we study them as our primary goal.

The discussion which follows will proceed in two more or less distinct stages. In the first chapter we will examine in more detail the formal and institutional aspects of the cabinet in Canadian parliamentary government as an institutional background to later more behaviourally oriented sections. The chapter will include a short historical section on the introduction and evolution of cabinet government in Canada. This will be followed by a brief discussion of the nature of cabinet government in Canada and the relationship of the institution to the political system. It will be kept as short as possible since it is intended primarily to set the institutional stage for the actors who follow.





In the second stage the main body of material gathered in considerable detail concerning the men who have served in Canada's federal cabinets will be presented. There will be a number of separate chapters in this section, each dealing in some detail with one particular aspect of the members' backgrounds.

The first such chapter will deal with the ethnic and territorial distribution of cabinet ministers and will include analysis of the ethnic orientation,<sup>2</sup> the actual ethnic origin by specific nationality and the places of birth of the cabinet ministers. There will also be detailed analysis of regional and provincial representation in the cabinet since, as is already well known, this is one of the most basic determinants of cabinet structure. An attempt will also be made to delineate attitudes of each of our major parties concerning the representation of various elements of the Canadian electorate over the years since 1867. This chapter will, in short, discuss the implications of the basic federal and cultural facts of the Canadian polity and indicate in broad outline some of the simplest yet most important variables which are taken into account when a Prime Minister builds his cabinet.

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<sup>2</sup> Basically, this term refers to the fact that most cabinet members have represented either English or French Canada in spite of the fact that their family's origin may be what we would call "other European". This applies especially to English-speaking members.



Next, the social backgrounds of cabinet ministers will be discussed. Here we are concerned with education, religion, occupation, social status, family connections and some rather more marginal points such as marital status or reputation as an intellectual. Throughout this report the analysis will take four basic directions. Firstly, French and English-oriented ministers will be compared for each of four periods (1867-1896, 1896-1921, 1921-48 and 1948-65) for each variable. Comparisons will similarly be made between each of the two major parties in each of the above periods. Then the members of the cabinet will be compared to the population at large for similar periods in order to determine to what extent this particular elite is representative of the population as a whole. Finally the ministers of the crown will be compared to the rest of the House of Commons in an attempt to see what it is that sets them off from the ordinary M.P.

The next chapter will deal with the political career patterns of the members of the cabinet. Firstly, it will cover the pre-appointment careers of these men and will examine their provincial political backgrounds as well as their activities in federal politics leading up to cabinet appointment. Again the comparison will be between ethnic groups by period, between parties and by period and between cabinet ministers





and the rest of the House of Commons. Secondly, it will deal with the post-cabinet career patterns of ministers, seeking to determine how many remained in politics after leaving the cabinet and where they went in political life, how many of them took patronage posts and what these posts were and finally how many of them returned to private life. Comparison is again by period between ethnic orientation and between parties.

Throughout this chapter it is hoped to determine whether there are any well recognized channels of advancement for either ethnic group. By seeking to know what goes into a minister's career it may also be possible to determine the extent of his commitment to national or to provincial-sectional politics and hence gain some insight into decision-making at the topmost level of our political elite.

The introduction to this work is hardly the place to state what the conclusions will be, but as a general guideline to the type of inquiry being pursued it may be helpful to point out that throughout this study we are making an attempt to determine what the structure of the cabinet is really like in terms of the men who run it and thereby to evaluate its weaknesses and strengths as a means of accommodation in Canada. The cabinet is one of the principal





mechanisms of accommodation between various cultural and regional groupings in Canadian society and it is the task of this discussion to determine how the structure of the cabinet has taken account of this fact. We will discuss with what purpose a Prime Minister sets out to construct his cabinet - using the ex post facto data of completed cabinet structure - and what effects this has on government in Canada. We will then be able to state what the cabinet is, who mans it and what the implications of its structure are for the country. Conversely we will be able to state what the implications of a federal, sectionalized, pluralistic and bi-cultural society are for cabinet government.

The thesis for this investigation is simply that the cabinet is an instrument of racial, geographical and social accommodation in Canada. The purpose of this study is to determine as accurately as possible the extent to which this is so and where possible to attach numbers to historical generalizations in an attempt at illustration.

That it is an instrument of accommodation need not imply that the cabinet is in all ways a representative institution. In places, especially where dealing with the cabinet as a means of social accommodation we will find that it is but weakly representative of the population at large.



But this is really to say no more than that certain elites tend to govern society and that there are frequently, and in fact usually rather large differences between the backgrounds of the members of these elites and the members of the rest of the society which they govern. We will find that, in the main the cabinet is constructed to accommodate the various segments of Canadian society. Even where it does not appear representative in the sense of being a mirror in microcosm of society, it will be useful to remember that for an elite to govern effectively and to conciliate diverse interests it is not essential that it be identical with these interests but merely that it be accepted by those who are governed as a sufficient bargainer for their needs.

But that leads into a far broader field of leadership perception by followers and that is a problem for extensive research and not for this report. It is mentioned here only in an attempt to make clear that this is not only an essay in the representative nature of the federal cabinet but more an attempt to determine exactly what the cabinet is, is used for and especially how it is manned. We are interested in its properties as a conciliator of many interests in Canada and especially between our two charter races and not solely as a representative institution.





The value of the data in any report such as this depends directly on the sources and methods used to gather it and on the way it has been handled. This material is too relevant to the value of the report to be left out completely yet it is not properly a part of the analysis itself. For this reason it has been included in appendix II following the final chapter. By examining it the reader may place a proper evaluation on the data used in the body of the report. Similarly detailed tables of cabinet structure, where they are not reproduced directly in the text are included in appendix I in order that all material relevant to any part of the analysis may be at hand. The reproduction of all tables in the main body of the text would be clumsy and make reading difficult but they are essential and so are included as an appendix for ready reference.

Before going into the body of this analysis I would like to acknowledge a number of debts. The original idea of carrying out this sort of study of cabinet members as opposed to the study of the cabinet as an institution arose at Carleton University and much of the early and basic research was carried out by undergraduates under the direction of Professor K.D. McRae. The idea was adopted by the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism in the summer of





1964 and at that time considerable further research was carried out by Edward Borins and Claude Boileau under the direction of Professors McRae and Meisel. Since then the work has continued under the supervision of Professor Meisel. The computer work for the report was carried out by Professor Jean Fortier. Professor Gibson of Queen's University whose historical report this work is intended to complement read an early draft and provided very many helpful suggestions. No one but myself, however, can be blamed for whatever errors or inaccuracies may appear in the report.



## CHAPTER I

## THE EVOLUTION AND FUNCTION OF CABINET GOVERNMENT IN CANADA

The period from about 1849 to 1877 saw the slow growth of the institution of cabinet government in Canada and the process was, except for matters involving external affairs, substantially completed well before the formal enunciation of its principles for Britain's overseas Dominions in 1926. It is the purpose of this chapter to outline briefly the introduction of cabinet government to Canada and to describe its evolution in the years following Confederation. As well it will include an examination of the position and some of the functions of the cabinet in Canadian government. In the main this report is concerned with the men in this institution but before the characteristics of the men can be understood the institution itself must be described and it is to that task that we devote the next several pages.<sup>1</sup>

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1. Undoubtedly the most valuable work published on the introduction of cabinet government to Canada and its evolution to 1933 was that of Norman Rogers. His articles "The Introduction of Cabinet Government to Canada", "Federal Influences on the Canadian Cabinet", and "The Evolution and Reform of the Canadian Cabinet" on pages 1, 103, and 227 of The Canadian Bar Review, v. XI, (1933) are extremely valuable and have been used extensively in this chapter. R.M. Dawson has three chapters on the cabinet in his Government of Canada, p. 197ff. which also rely fairly heavily upon Roger's work. They comprise what is probably the most complete institutional description of the Cabinet done to date. Other material is found scattered in various standard historical sources, political biographies and memoirs. These are footnoted throughout where they have been used.





Cabinet government with its adjunct, responsible government, grew slowly in Canada in the years prior to Confederation. The root institution in the United Canadas was the old colonial Executive Council. Before 1849 the use made of this council was strongly dependent on the predilections of the Governor in office. The idea of responsible government, that the Governor's Executive Council should be chosen from men acceptable to but not necessarily members of the popularly elected Legislative Assembly, was fairly well conceded before 1849 but while a Sir Edmund Head might encourage his Executive Council to take an active role in decision making, a Lord Metcalfe could, without breaking any really established usage be essentially his own cabinet.

The concept of Responsible Government, then, left room for an activist sovereign, be he King or Governor, whereas true Cabinet Government depends on a distinct separation between the "dignified" executive - the Monarch or formal head of state and the "efficient" executive - the Cabinet which actually carries on the activities of state.<sup>2</sup> In fact:

"Cabinet government means the withdrawal of the sovereign from the active conduct of affairs,

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2. Walter Bagehot, The English Constitution, p. 12.





leaving executive decisions to a group of ministers who enjoy the confidence of the House of Commons and who must assume the entire responsibility for acts done in the name of the Crown."<sup>3</sup>

In Canada, after the principle of responsible government had been achieved, the Governor was still entitled and indeed often expected to take an active role in politics. The next major step towards full cabinet government, then, was to have the Governor stop attending meetings of the Executive Council and this principle was first established during the tenure of Sir Edmund Head in about 1854.<sup>4</sup> By the eve of Confederation, it would have been at least very unusual for a Governor of the United Canadas to attend a meeting of his council for any but ceremonial purposes.

The British North America Act makes very little mention of the real executive structure of the Canadian government, saying only that:

"There shall be a council to aid and advise in the government of Canada, to be styled the Queen's Privy Council for Canada; and the persons who are to be members of that council shall be from time to time chosen and summoned by the Governor-General and sworn in as Privy Councillors and members thereof may from time to time be removed

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3. Norman Rogers, "The Introduction of Cabinet Government to Canada", p. 5.

4. Ibid., p. 5.



by the Governor-General."<sup>5</sup>

Furthermore, executive authority was to be exercisable

"... with the advice and consent of the respective executive councils ... or in conjunction with those councils or with any number of members thereof or by those Governors individually."<sup>6</sup>

There is certainly no need to point out here the vast discrepancy between the written constitution and the real exercise of executive authority in Canada.<sup>7</sup> By 1867, and indeed for several years before Confederation, it was well accepted usage that the Governor-General (or Governor) was to pick as his Prime Minister the man he felt could best command the majority in the House of Commons or the elected house and leave the selection of the rest of the Cabinet which was, in reality, a committee of the Executive, and later of the Privy Council, to him. But even this choice could be of considerable executive significance as it was in 1873 when Lord Dufferin asked Alexander Mackenzie, as opposed to Edward Blake or Alexander Galt, to form a new ministry to replace that of Macdonald.<sup>8</sup> It again became a vital

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5. British North America Act, (British Statutes, 3 Victoria Ch. 3) Part III paragraph 11.

6. Ibid., Part III paragraph 12.

7. See R.M. Dawson, "The Cabinet: Position and Personnel", Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, XII, 3, (August, 1946) or Government of Canada, p. 196ff.

8. Richard Cartwright, Reminiscences, p. 121ff.





matter in 1926 during the hectic days of the constitutional crisis and only in the period following those events was it established finally that the Governor-General had in fact no real executive authority whatsoever beyond what his incumbent ministers chose to advise.<sup>9</sup>

Although the whole issue of cabinet government in the Dominions reared its head again in the 1920's, the true position of the executive authority had been settled far earlier in 1878. The Letters Patent dispatched to Canada with the first Governor-General in 1867 indicated that while it was not normal usage for the Governor to sit with his Executive Council, it was by no means entirely improper for him to do so. As late as 1873 an exchange of letters between Lord Dufferin and Macdonald suggested that the former felt he still had the right to be present at Executive Council meetings.<sup>10</sup> Macdonald's reply, if indeed he made one, does not seem to have been preserved, but a draft set of Letters Patent circulated from Britain in 1875 again

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9. It was then stated: "The Governor-General of a Dominion is the representative of the crown (as opposed to the British Government) holding in all essential respects the same position to the administration of public affairs in the Dominion as is held by His Majesty the King in Great Britain." Imperial Conference, 1926, Summary of Proceedings, p. 14.

10. Quoted in Norman Rogers, "The Introduction of Cabinet Government in Canada", p. 12.



implied that the Governor-General had this right. Thus a clear distinction was being drawn between cabinet government in Britain and Canada. Edward Blake, who was, at that time, Minister of Justice took exception to the letter in very strong terms, pointing out that the precedents of over 20 years were clearly against the Governor attending meetings of that committee of his Privy Council which had become known as the Cabinet.<sup>11</sup>

Similarly the Letters Patent pointed out that in some cases the Governor-General could act against the advice of his ministers. The cases were left unspecified. Blake, in a series of letters, pointed out that what Canadians sought was an extension to Canada of the standard rules and practices of British cabinet government. The British practice was, as far as he was concerned, that if the sovereign could not agree with a group of ministers then the ministers would resign and others who would agree and could command majority support in the elected house be found. If no others who could command such a majority could be found, then the sovereign must accept his ministers' opinion unless an ensuing election, which could only be called on the advice of the incumbent ministry, had vindicated the sovereign

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11. Ibid., p. 16.





by producing a majority in the house which would agree with the sovereign. A complicated stew which boiled down to the fact that the sovereign was ruled by Parliament and not vice versa. What the British government had proposed for Canada was clearly out of joint with this principle and not at all acceptable were we to have a constitution "similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom".<sup>12</sup>

The Imperial office conceded Blake's point and the Letters Patent issued to the Marquess of Lorne in 1878 contained no clauses which would differentiate cabinet government in Canada from that in Great Britain. Full cabinet government had now been established in Canada. In internal political matters the Dominion was essentially autonomous and Parliament was supreme. The cabinet was the directing voice of Parliament and hence was to be the top political body in the country.

The institution itself has by no means remained static during the past one hundred years. Its size has tended to vary considerably according to Prime Minister and to current political exigencies. Its portfolios are in a constant state of flux and it is continuously evolving new machinery to deal with its problems. We will look very quickly here

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12. Blake's correspondence is reproduced at length in Norman Rogers "The Introduction of Cabinet Government in Canada",



at each of these components of change.

Sir John A. Macdonald's first cabinet consisted of thirteen members including the Prime Minister and as we shall see below, Macdonald went to great lengths to keep it as small as possible.<sup>13</sup> Similarly, Alexander Mackenzie kept the size of his first cabinet at thirteen feeling that a larger body would be far too cumbersome to operate properly.<sup>14</sup>

The size of both these cabinets was dependent directly on a proper distribution of seats between ethnic groups and Provinces. Thus, Cartier would accept no less than three portfolios for French-speaking Quebecers in the first Cabinet. One English-speaking Quebecer made four in all from that province and Ontario, with its larger population could accept no less than five. New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, "properly" represented, required two cabinet positions apiece making thirteen in all.<sup>15</sup> Given the Federal nature of Canada, Mackenzie could make no real change in these numbers and in fact, both Mackenzie and Macdonald were only able to avoid expanding the cabinet by finding seats in Ontario and Quebec for ministers who could also represent the newer provinces of British Columbia, Prince Edward

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13. Alexander Pope. *Memoirs of John A. Macdonald*, P. 349 ff.

14. Sister Teresa Avila Burke, "Mackenzie and his Cabinet", *Canadian Historical Review*, XLI, (1960), p. 128.

15. Alexander Pope, loc. cit.





Island and Manitoba. But in 1888 an indigenous westerner, Edgar Dewdney, was appointed to the cabinet and from then on the attempt to hold down cabinet size was progressively swamped in a wave of provincial demands. By the time Sir Charles Tupper formed a cabinet in 1896 there were seventeen ministers.<sup>16</sup>

The honeymoon following Laurier's election in 1896 allowed the Prime Minister to reduce the size of the cabinet to fourteen men of whom two were without portfolio, but by the time he left office in 1911 Laurier had seventeen men in the cabinet with him.<sup>17</sup> Borden seems to have made no attempt at all to hold down cabinet sizes and under him the newly formed 1911 ministry had eighteen members. His union government, admittedly formed under extremely unusual conditions had twenty-three members.<sup>18</sup>

In 1921 Mackenzie King succeeded in cutting the cabinet to nineteen men and in 1935 by means of an heroic effort to sixteen.<sup>19</sup> The second war seems to have permanently blown

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16. Public Archives of Canada, Guide to Canadian Ministries Since Confederation, pp. 25-6.

17. Ibid., pp. 27-30.

18. R.L. Borden, Memoirs, v. I, p. 332, v. II, p. 757.

19. R.M. Dawson, Mackenzie King, v. I, p. 360 and Government of Canada, p. 262.



the lid off cabinet sizes, for Mr. St. Laurent's 1948 cabinet had twenty members,<sup>20</sup> Mr. Diefenbaker's 1958 cabinet had twenty-one and shortly twenty-two<sup>21</sup> and Mr. Pearson's present cabinet has set a peace-time record at twenty-six members.<sup>22</sup>

We will be returning, in one way or another, to the whole topic of cabinet size frequently in the following pages but it might be useful to point out here a few of the reasons for the drastic increases in the post-war era. Obviously, not all the changes are due to federal factors, for Canada gained only one new province in the post-war period and Newfoundland is represented by only one cabinet minister. Much of the most recent increase in size may be accounted for by the new assertiveness of Quebec. Whereas in 1948 Mr. St. Laurent partly, no doubt, because he himself was French could satisfy Quebec with five out of twenty ministers or 25 per cent of the total portfolios, in 1965 ministers from Quebec or those who spoke French as a primary language constituted 38.5 per cent of the cabinet. As the Quebec contingent increases, so must that from other sections of

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20. Canadian Parliamentary Guide, 1949, pp. 13, 14.

21. Ibid., 1958, pp. 13, 14.

22. Canadian Almanac and Directory, 1965, p. 298. This report was written in September 1965.





the country. Even if Quebec gets the largest percentage increase, the other provinces must get something as well and a snowball effect which is very hard to check builds up.

Two other reasons for increasing cabinet size may be postulated. The first is the simple proliferation of government departments as the functions of government increase in scope. Many new departments outstrip in size many of the older ones and to expect them to do without a minister in the cabinet is unreasonable, yet the older ones cannot be simply tossed out. Another reason, which is no doubt secondary, is that to some extent the machinery of cabinet government has improved.<sup>23</sup> The use of both ad hoc and standing committees has increased greatly since the war - largely as a result of war-time experience - and this has enabled even the larger cabinet to be fairly effective as an executive body.

Various means have been devised in an attempt at keeping down the size of the cabinet. An early one was the establishment of non-cabinet ministerial posts. The 1890's

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23. See R.M. Dawson Government of Canada, p. 258ff. and A.D.P. Heeney "Cabinet Government in Canada: Some Recent Developments in the Machinery of the Central Executive", Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, v. XII, (1946) p. 282.



saw the establishment of the posts of Controller of Customs and Controller of Inland Revenue, both intended primarily as administrative positions and the post of Solicitor-General long existed in a sort of executive limbo, now in, now out of the cabinet. But in 1897 the two controllers were brought into the cabinet and departments established for them so that experiment too died.<sup>24</sup> With it the idea of establishing non-cabinet ministerial posts on any sort of regular basis seems to have disappeared from the minds of our Prime Ministers.

The idea of Parliamentary Assistants was first introduced in Canada during the first world war but their use lapsed after its close. They were re-introduced during the second war and have since become a permanent part of the parliamentary scene. They are not intended primarily to reduce the size of the cabinet, however, and they have obviously done nothing in that direction. Aside from being a primary recruiting ground for cabinet ministers they are not of further interest to us here.

In 1911 Prime Minister Borden appointed Sir George Murray of the British Civil Service to examine the civil service in Canada and in 1919 a Senate committee on the

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24. Norman Rogers, "Evolution and Reform of the Canadian Cabinet", p. 229ff. See also Public Archives of Canada, Guide to Canadian Ministries, p. 20ff.





machinery of government made its report. Both suggested a reduction in cabinet size of ten to twelve members, but neither was very specific on how it was to be done and, like most similar proposals for institutional change, they were quietly forgotten.

This is not really the place to discuss the ramifications of increased cabinet size except to reiterate that, in some part at least, it seems to have taken place in an attempt to give French Canadians a greater share in the decision-making process at the upper level of the Canadian political elite. It has probably also made that elite seem less remote to the general population and since 39 per cent of the present cabinet, ten members in all, are capable of addressing French Canadians in their own language we might reasonably infer that some attempt has been made to move the political elite of Canada closer to Quebec.

In addition to the matter of size, only one other facet of institutional change need be mentioned here - although much of the rest of the report is concerned with changes over time in the characteristics of the men who have made up the institution - that is the matter of portfolios. A number of portfolios have remained essentially unchanged in relative importance since the early years.



Those of Finance or Justice come readily to mind, but a number of others have changed radically in importance and some formerly vital posts such as Railways and Canals or Interior have disappeared entirely. At this point in the discussion, this fact does not mean a great deal, but later the reader is cautioned to use considerable care in evaluating the influence of a portfolio, for this is strongly dependent upon the period in question. To be minister of Public Works today is to hold a minor cabinet post, but in an era when the total federal expenditure might be only 20 million dollars most of which went in to capital construction it was a major position.

Finally in this preliminary chapter it will be useful to devote some space to the discussion of the functions of the cabinet in the Canadian parliamentary system. Later on the discussion will be focussed on the cabinet as a social and political mechanism of accommodation, but here the concern is with its more purely parliamentary functions - what does the cabinet do in parliamentary government?

For purposes of simplification the functions of the cabinet in parliamentary government may be divided into three broad areas, namely the executive, legislative and political. The three continually overlap and their differentiation for analysis is, of course, artificial but each will be





discussed in turn here.

Turning first, then, to the executive functions of the cabinet, its first and most obvious task is the administration of individual departments of government. The cabinet minister is not normally selected for his expertise in a particular field and this is not the place to revive that old argument as to whether he should be or not, but this does not mean that he will not have administrative duties in his department. For the cabinet minister is still in a real sense the head of his department and while he will, in all normal circumstances, rely very heavily upon the advice of his deputy minister, the final decision in overall policy matters is still his. How much a particular minister will make of his administrative prerogatives and how much he will act as a prod to his department will depend upon the minister's personal qualities, but the power is there and the overall supervision of the department is still the minister's right and to some extent his duty. The government of the day is still responsible for all the acts of its civil servants.

To the cabinet as a whole also belongs the administration of government on a supra-departmental scale. Actions involving more than one department, if they are at all significant will require the approval and the co-ordination



of at the very least the ministers of the departments involved and any major decisions of policy involving extensive inter-departmental co-operation are taken at the whole cabinet level. The overall co-ordination of government policy would be quite impossible without a highly responsible executive existing at the top to act as the major 'combining committee'.

When the discussion turns to the legislative functions of the cabinet, it will be clear that the cabinet gains much of its power and responsibility because it is the intermediary between the vast executive machinery and Parliament. The formal decision making procedure still rests in Parliament. But Parliament, in session, has become almost the slave of the cabinet and when it is not in session the cabinet's rule becomes even more absolute for the nation's business must go on just the same and the cabinet continues to make decisions and to carry on government. Since it is a small body and since its members are in Ottawa a great deal of the time anyhow, the cabinet is very easily used as a means of carrying on government when Parliament is in recess, prorogued or in dissolution. This, again, is a measure of the amount of control that the cabinet has over Parliament, for in spite of occasional protests from prevaricating Prime Ministers that 'Parliament will decide' the cabinet can do almost anything in the confident belief





that Parliament will uphold it when it returns to Ottawa.

The cabinet also plays a role in the field of general federal leadership. It is, in reality, the cabinet and not Parliament that negotiates with the provinces and Dominion-Provincial conferences between cabinet ministers of the federal and the provincial governments from the Prime Ministers on down have become increasingly important, especially since the late 1950's. The cabinet ministers are the negotiators here and to a fairly large extent they are on their own in this important area.

Finally in the executive area, it should be pointed out that cabinet ministers are perceived by the public as the topmost executive level in government. They are responsible not only to Parliament for their policies, but also to the electorate and they are continually pressed to explain their departmental policies outside of Parliament as well as within. They thus act as the major visible line between the public and the executive side of government. While a local M.P. may be looked upon by his constituents as the spokesman for the government policies as a whole, he is not usually looked upon as the spokesman for any particular department; that is the minister's singular responsibility.

In the purely political sense the cabinet is above all else the managing committee for the party in power. These



are the men who have reached the peak of political success in their party and to them in large measure must belong the direction of their party in politics. The extremely weak central structure of the major parties in Canada and their property of being, in many ways, a group of men united primarily out of a desire to see themselves rather than some particular principle in power only serves to aggrandize the role of this group as the party-in-power's central decision-making body. True, executive committees do exist and to them formally belong many major decisions and true, the broadest questions are decided in convention but the cabinet has the inestimable value of being on the spot and summonable at any time. It contains the majority of the party's most successful men. It dispenses the party patronage and its members, as we shall see later are very often selected for the amount of political support they can muster at home. It is hardly surprising, then, that for the party in power many of the most important political decisions are made by the cabinet. The men in the cabinet are in touch with M.P.'s, with the machinery of government, with the Prime Minister and perhaps above all with the grass-roots political leaders in their provinces and hence command a unique position available to no one else in the country. They are, in short, their party's political as well as executive elite.

Finally the cabinet has a number of vital legislative





functions. Most obviously it formulates its party's legislative program and has the responsibility for piloting it through Parliament. Theirs is the responsibility to see that a well planned legislative program gets through the House. The means of their control over Parliament are too well known to require amplification here. Their control of patronage - a control exercised in many cases with no say from the Prime Minister<sup>25</sup> - and the ability to call a general election - basically a Prime Ministerial prerogative exercised with cabinet advice - thus throwing the M.P.'s up to the expense and risk of the hustings are sufficient along with the normal lines of party control to ensure the passage of almost any sort of government legislation. Moreover they are the contact between the Parliament and the vast civil service mechanism. They are directly responsible for their departmental programs and policies in the House and at the tabling of the departmental estimates they must be prepared to defend their departments from all sides and on all manner of points.

The role of the cabinet in Canadian legislative executive and political processes is indeed a vital one and the cabinet can quite properly be considered the centre of gravity

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25. Norman Rogers, "Federal Influences on the Canadian Cabinet", p. 117.



of the Canadian Parliamentary system. As an institution the cabinet is probably more powerful than any other in Canada. But all of this is simply background for examining the cabinet in another one of its roles, that of the grand accommodator of the myriad interests in Canada. Having seen its historical background and its legislative and executive functions, we now turn to the problem of seeing who the men who make up this vital institution have been. In so doing we can see how a body that has only the most ephemeral existence in our written constitution has become in many ways one of the major conciliator of interests in Canadian society. By knowing about the men who have operated the institution we can better come to know the institution itself.





## CHAPTER II

THE PROVINCIAL AND ETHNIC DISTRIBUTIONS  
OF CABINET MINISTERSProvincial Determinants

"I think I may defy them to shew that the cabinet can be formed on any other principle than that of a representation of the several provinces in that cabinet. Your federal problem will have to be worked out around the table of the Executive Council."<sup>1</sup>

This prediction was made in 1865 by Christopher Dunkin, one of the most perceptive critics of the idea of Confederation. That he was substantially correct it is the purpose of the rest of this chapter to show. From the very first days of Confederation it was obvious that the Senate, which was intended to be the main federal body in Canada, would not do as an arbiter of the federation. The Senate itself had little real power and the basis of its representation was rather nebulously federal. Yet four independently minded colonies had been quickly welded together and each was anxious to retain some substantial degree of control over federal political decision making. In the first Cabinet, as we have already seen, Cartier would accept no less than

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1. Christopher Dunkin, Confederation Debates, pp. 497, 513.



four seats for Quebec of which three were to be held by French Canadians. Larger than Quebec, Ontario had to demand one more seat and if Nova Scotia and New Brunswick were to have any say in the Council of Confederation they must have two posts apiece. The federal principle was immediately set up as the most important determinant of Cabinet structure and there has been no change since.

For many years it was customary to consider Western Canada as a single unit in appointing Cabinet Ministers, but after the establishment of Alberta and Saskatchewan in 1905 the line became increasingly difficult to hold. By 1906 the West had been conceded the right to two ministers, and by 1911, to four. By 1917 not only were there four Western representatives in the cabinet, but every province was represented by them and Meighen's 1921 Cabinet retained this principle. By the time Mackenzie King was elected in 1921 he considered the process of representation of each province sufficiently vital to open a seat in Quebec for Charles Stewart, a former Premier of Alberta whom he wanted in his Cabinet to represent Alberta even though that ungrateful province had returned not a single Liberal Member of Parliament. Only Prince Edward Island has a weak foothold on the principle of Cabinet representation and even her meager claim cannot always be ignored.





TABLE 2-1

(1)

PROVINCIAL REPRESENTATION IN CABINET BY PRIME MINISTER  
(Figures in Percentages)

Province	N.W.T. Pre- 1905	P.E.I.	N.B.	N.S.	Nfld.	Que.	Ont.	Man.	Sask.	Alta.	B.C.	N.W.T. Present	Wild	Total N in Row
<u>Prime Minister</u>														
Macdonald	2.1	2.1	10.6	17.0	-	31.9	34.0	-	-	-	0	-	2.1	47
Mackenzie	0	4.3	8.7	17.4	-	39.1	30.4	0	-	-	0	-	0	23
1891-96 (2)	0	6.7	0	6.7	-	40.0	20.0	20.0	-	-	6.7	-	0	15
Laurier	0	3.3	10.0	10.0	-	40.0	30.0	3.3	0	3.3	0	0	0	30
Borden	-	0	6.7	3.3	-	33.3	30.0	13.3	3.3	6.7	3.3	0	0	30
Meighen	-	3.8	11.5	11.5	-	11.5	38.5	0	3.8	3.8	7.7	0	7.7	26
King	-	1.5	10.3	7.4	-	30.9	27.9	5.9	4.4	1.5	5.9	0	4.4	68
Bennett	-	0	9.5	9.5	-	28.6	33.3	4.8	4.8	0	4.8	0	4.8	21
St. Laurent	-	-	-	5.9	11.8	35.3	23.5	5.9	0	5.9	11.8	0	0	17
Diefenbaker	-	2.6	5.3	2.6	2.6	28.9	31.6	7.9	5.3	5.3	7.9	0	0	38
Pearson	-	4.3	4.3	4.3	0	39.1	34.8	4.3	0	4.3	4.3	0	0	23
Totals	0.3	2.4	8.0	8.9	0.9	32.0	30.8	5.3	2.4	2.7	4.4	0	2.1	338

1. By period of first appointment to the cabinet. Thus if a minister served under more than one Prime Minister he appears only under the first. It should also be noted that no account has been taken of the length of service in the cabinet. Thus, since Quebec ministers have generally tended to serve for shorter periods than those from other provinces they appear to have held a greater share of cabinet posts than is really the case.

2. The Prime Ministers in this period were Abbott, Bowell, Thompson and Tupper.



TABLE 2-2

DISTRIBUTION OF THE CANADIAN POPULATION BY PROVINCE (1871-1961)  
(Figures in Percentages)

Year	(1) 1871	(1) 1881	(1) 1891	(2) 1901	(2) 1911	(2) 1921	(2) 1931	(2) 1941	(2) 1951	(2) 1961
Province										
Newfoundland	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.6	2.5
Nova Scotia	10.5	10.5	9.4	8.6	6.8	6.0	4.9	5.0	4.6	4.0
New Brunswick	7.7	7.5	6.7	6.2	4.9	4.4	3.9	4.0	3.7	3.3
PEI	2.5	2.5	2.3	1.9	1.3	1.0	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.6
Quebec	32.3	31.6	31.0	30.7	27.8	26.9	27.7	29.0	29.0	28.8
Ontario	45.9	44.9	44.0	44.6	35.1	33.4	33.1	32.9	32.8	34.2
Manitoba	0.7	1.5	3.2	4.8	6.4	6.9	6.7	6.3	5.5	5.1
Saskatchewan	-	-	-	1.7	6.8	8.6	8.9	7.8	5.9	5.1
Alberta	-	-	-	1.4	5.2	6.7	7.1	6.9	6.7	7.3
British Columbia	1.0	1.2	2.0	3.3	5.4	6.0	6.7	7.1	8.3	8.9
Yukon and Territories	-	-	-	0.9	0.4	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2
Canada Totals x 10 <sup>3</sup>	3689.3	4324.8	4833.2	5371.3	7206.6	8787.9	10576.8	11506.7	14009.4	18233.2

Sources: (1) Census of Canada, 1891, V.1, pp. 366-9

(2) Census of Canada, 1961, V.7, Pt. 1, Bul. 1, Table 1.





With this said let us now turn to an examination of the actual numbers involved in provincial and sectional representation. We are here primarily concerned with tables 2-1 and 2-2 showing respectively provincial representation in the Cabinet by Prime Minister and Provincial populations for each Canadian census. The figures in table 2-1 as in all subsequent tables dealing with Cabinet Ministers are concerned with new appointees to the Cabinet only.<sup>2</sup> Keeping this in mind, let us examine the figures in a bit more detail. The Northwest Territories before 1905 (now Alberta and Saskatchewan) had only one Cabinet Minister in keeping with the fact that by 1901 their population was only 3.1 per cent of Canada's total. In spite of the fact that Prince Edward Island's population has declined (both numerically and proportionately) from 2.5 per cent of Canada's to 0.1 per cent and in spite of the fact that Prime Ministers continually assert their right not to represent Prince Edward Island, the Island has usually managed to get a Cabinet Minister

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2. See Appendix 2.



at some time under each Prime Minister. New Brunswick has seen her normal Cabinet representation drop from an average of two per Cabinet (or 10-15 per cent of Cabinet strength) to one per Cabinet (or 5-8 per cent of Cabinet strength) as her population has fallen from 7.7 to 3.3 per cent of the Canadian total and Nova Scotia has seen a parallel drop in Cabinet representation as her population fell from 10.5 to 4.0 per cent of the Canadian total.





The Quebec proportion of Cabinet seats has remained fairly steady around a mean of 32 per cent. Peaks of 40 per cent in Laurier's time and between 1891-96 were due to rapid turnover rather than an increase in the number of portfolios held by French Canadians whereas in the present day Cabinet French Canadians do hold more (39%) portfolios than they ever have before. The fact that rapid turnover can affect these percentages must be taken into account for it means that these figures are approximations over time only. For the actual structure of the cabinet at a given point in time it is necessary to use these figures in conjunction with an actual list of ministers holding posts at that time. It is worth noting, however, the extremely low representation of Quebec in Mr. Meighen's Cabinets. In the period following the conscription crisis it was next to impossible to obtain French Canadians for Conservative Cabinets. Meighen could find only one for his 1921 Cabinet, P.E. Blondin, and he sat in the Senate.<sup>3</sup>

The population of Ontario has declined proportionately from 45.9 per cent of the Canadian total to 34.2 per cent yet her representation in the Cabinet has remained steady at around 30 per cent. Quebec, with a slightly smaller population has usually tended to slightly outrank Ontario

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3. His 1926 Cabinet, however, had five French Canadians.



in Cabinet membership partly because both French and English in Quebec must be represented and partly because of the rapid turnover of French ministers in certain periods. As we shall see below, ethnic considerations rank with sectional ones as primary determinants of Cabinet membership.

Manitoba has had a rather variable degree of Cabinet representation. Her normal contingent based on population considerations is one Minister per Cabinet and this shows up in the fact that her average representation since 1871 has been 5.3 per cent. But of appointments made by Borden 13.3 per cent were from Manitoba - at one point he had three ministers from Manitoba out of eighteen in his Cabinet - and the period 1891-96 sees an abnormally high Manitoba figure because of a very high turnover rate. The type of bias our statistics can produce is indicated when the Meighen Cabinets show no appointments from Manitoba. The first implication would be that there were no Manitoba representatives in either 1921 or 1926 but in fact Meighen himself was a Manitoban. This anomaly arises because he appears only where he was first appointed - under Borden. At any rate, since Mr. King's first ministry the Manitoba representation has been constant at about 5 per cent.





Saskatchewan had no Cabinet Minister until 1911 but since then has usually had one member in the Cabinet and the same applies to Alberta. Since 1905 their proportion of Cabinet appointments has been about 5 per cent each. Variation in Saskatchewan's population from 8.9 per cent of the Canadian population in 1931 to 5.1 per cent now has made no difference in her Cabinet representation.

British Columbia was first given a Cabinet post in 1891-96 and since has traditionally held one portfolio as its population has climbed from 2.0 to 8.9 per cent of the Canadian total.

Since entering Confederation in 1948 Newfoundland has comprised about 2.5 per cent of the Canadian population and this has entitled her to a single Cabinet portfolio.

A number of generalizations can be made from the foregoing data. Firstly, no matter how small a province and no matter how often Prime Ministers may reiterate the fact that there is no obligation on their part to represent every province, the claim to provincial representation in the Cabinet is a tenacious one. Prince Edward Island has had a Cabinet Minister for at least half the period since



Confederation and to reject her claim is still not easy. Newfoundland, with 2.5 per cent of the population, seems to have an unquestionable claim to one Cabinet post. Following from this, any proportion of the total Canadian population between 2.5 and 9-10 per cent seems to entitle a province to one Minister.<sup>4</sup> Thus Newfoundland and British Columbia are at a federal parity as far as the right to representation is concerned. This is a rather interesting indication of the application of the federal principle to Cabinet construction.

The data discussed above do tend to back up the already well-known fact that provincial-regional representation is vital in Cabinet formation and that within broad limits and with the exceptions of Ontario and Quebec and the historical exceptions of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, the principle one province -- one Minister has been applied to Cabinet construction.

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4. Since no province lies in population between British Columbia (8.9 per cent) and Quebec (28.8 per cent) it is difficult to be very accurate here.





TABLE 2-3

(1)

NATIVE BORN MINISTERS BY PROVINCE  
(Figures in percentages)

Province	P.E.I.	N.B.	N.S.	Nfld.	Que.	Ont.	Man.	Sask.	Alta.	B.C.
Proportion of native born ministers <sup>(1)</sup>	100.0	92.5	93.2	66.6	87.0	72.1	16.7	0	22.2	26.6
Total number of ministers from province	8	27	30	3	108	104	18	8	9	15

(1) The proportion of ministers representing that province who were born in that province.



Table 2-3 shows the number of Ministers representing a province who were actually born in that province. With the exception of Newfoundland which has had too few Ministers to be statistically significant there is an almost direct relationship between "Easterliness" and the percentage of native-born Ministers. For the Maritimes a two-pronged explanation may be suggested. Firstly, few people who were not born in the Maritimes move there for long enough to seek political office and secondly, those who do are not likely to be accepted as valid spokesmen by the inward looking Maritimers. That the Quebec proportion of native born Ministers is high needs no explanation -- most French-Canadian politicians are born in Quebec and stay there.

The Ontario population is considerably more transitory and the three prairie provinces and especially Alberta and Saskatchewan have scarcely been established long enough for many of the first native born generation to have attained Cabinet level. The proportion rises again in the somewhat older colony of British Columbia.





While these figures are hardly startling, they do form a corroboration of what we might already have suspected; that the older the province as a settled area the more likely it is that the political elite chosen from it will be indigenous.

### Ethnic Determinants

Tables 2-4, 2-5 and 2-6 describe respectively the ethnic distribution of Cabinet Ministers by Prime Minister, of the Canadian population by census, and of new members of Parliament by period. Again the tables are reasonably self-explanatory but some discussion of them is in order here.



TABLE 2-4

ETHNIC ORIGINS OF CABINET MINISTERS BY PRIME MINISTER  
(Figures in percentages)

Ethnic origin of ministers	English	Irish	Scottish	United Empire Loyalist	Anglo- Saxon not spec- ified	French	Other European	Total non- French(i.e. English oriented)	Total number in row
<u>Prime Minister</u>									
Macdonald	14.9	19.1	25.5	12.8	8.5	19.1	0	80.9	47
Mackenzie	8.7	0	17.4	21.7	17.4	34.8	0	65.2	23
1891-96	13.3	13.3	20.0	6.7	13.3	26.7	6.7	73.3	15
Laurier	13.3	20.0	20.0	6.7	13.3	26.7	0	73.3	30
Borden	13.3	20.0	13.3	6.7	23.3	23.3	0	76.7	30
Meighen	26.9	3.8	26.9	15.4	3.8	23.1	0	76.9	26
King	7.5	7.5	23.9	1.5	31.3	25.4	3.0	74.6	67
Bennett	23.8	4.8	28.6	0	14.3	28.6	0	71.4	21
St Laurent	23.5	0	17.6	0	29.4	29.4	0	70.6	17
Diefenbaker	8.1	5.4	8.1	48.6	27.0	27.0	2.7	73.0	37
Pearson	4.5	0	13.6	0	31.8	45.5	4.5	54.5	22
Total number in row	44	32	67	21	76	90	5	245	335
% of total cabinet ministers	13.1	9.6	20.0	6.3	22.7	26.9	1.5	73.1	





TABLE 2-5

ETHNIC STRUCTURE OF CANADIAN POPULATION 1871-1961  
(Figures in percentages)

Ethnic Origin	(1) 1871	(2) 1881	1891	(3) 1901	(3) 1911	(3) 1921	(3) 1931	(3) 1941	(3) 1951	(3) 1961
English	20.3	20.4	N/A*	23.5	26.0	29.0	26.4	25.8	25.9	23.0
Irish	24.3	22.1	N/A	18.4	14.9	12.6	11.9	11.0	10.3	9.6
Scottish	15.8	16.2	N/A	14.9	14.2	13.4	13.0	12.2	11.0	10.4
French	31.1	30.0	N/A	30.7	28.6	27.9	28.2	30.3	30.8	30.4
Other	8.7	11.3	N/A	12.5	16.3	17.2	20.5	20.7	21.9	26.6
Total in column x 10 <sup>3</sup>	3486.0	4324.8	4333.2	5371.3	7206.6	8787.9	10376.8	11506.6	14009.4	18238.2

(1) Canada census, 1871, V. 1, p. 332.

(2) Canada census, 1881, V. 1, pp. 300-01.

(3) Canada census, 1961, V. 1, pt. 2, Bul. 5, Table 34.

\* The 1891 census did not cover ethnic origin.



TABLE 2-6

(1)

ETHNIC ORIGIN MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT BY PERIOD  
(Figures in percentages)

Ethnic origin	1867- 1873	1874- 1877	1878- 1895	1896- 1899	1900- 1910	1911- 1929	1930- 1939	1940- 1953	1954- 1958	1959- 1964
French	24.9	25.3	27.2	24.8	20.5	21.7	30.8	28.7	31.3	48.1
English	31.5	16.5	25.3	23.9	26.9	26.2	24.2	32.3	30.8	29.1
Scottish	26.2	35.2	23.5	26.5	26.9	29.7	27.9	22.5	15.9	13.3
Irish	14.5	22.0	20.9	20.4	22.4	19.5	14.6	11.6	12.6	5.1
Other	2.8	1.1	3.1	4.4	3.2	2.9	2.5	4.9	9.3	4.4
Total number in column	317	91	383	113	308	512	240	387	214	158

(1) Data adapted from unpublished material by R.R. March. New members elected in the indicated period only.





The distribution of English Cabinet members and of English members of Parliament has been rather spotty. Surprisingly enough, when compared over the whole period since Confederation, the proportion of English-speaking Cabinet Ministers has been apparently rather lower than their relative proportions in either the House of Commons or the rest of Canada. The difference, however, is more apparent than real. In table 2-4 "English" means that the Minister specifically stated he was of English descent whereas in tables 2-5 and 2-6 it means anyone with an Anglo-Saxon name who is not demonstrably of Scottish or Irish stock. A better result for comparison is obtained by adding the English and Anglo-Saxon not specified designations in table 2-4 and when this is done it is seen that the English are at least proportionally represented and perhaps have had even more than their share of portfolios.

The proportion of Irish Ministers has shown a steady decline since the turn of this century as has their representation in Parliament and in the population. In 1871 the Irish, following waves of Irish immigration to North America earlier in the 19th century, constituted the largest single ethnic group in Canada aside from the French-Canadians and it was vital to have at all times an Irish-Catholic representative in the Cabinet. By 1961 the Irish had dwindled



to 9.6 per cent of the Canadian population and Mr. Pearson does not seem to have considered it essential to have anyone who is consciously representative of Irish-Catholics in his Cabinet. The proportion of Irish Members of Parliament has shown a similar dwindling away to negligible proportions.

Only since 1935 have the Scottish begun to dwindle in number as members of the Cabinet and the House of Commons. Until then the Scots with 15% or less of the Canadian population had managed to corner about 25% of Cabinet posts and a similar proportion of seats in the House. Since then however, the Scottish proclivity for gaining the seats of the mighty seems to have fallen into abeyance as the number of Ministers who consider themselves purely Canadian and representative of no particular ethnic group has risen. This increase appears in the "Anglo-Saxon not specified column" of table 2-4.

This column is perhaps more significant than it seems. Since the data was taken largely from sources supplied by the Ministers themselves. It is an index of how the Ministers perceive themselves and how they want





their constituents to perceive them. The fact that over half of the Ministers who are not French Canadian now prefer to be known simply as Canadian would seem to indicate a decreasing tendency for the fragmentation of the Canadian political elite along ethnic lines.

The column in table 2-4 entitled United Empire Loyalist is also instructive. Before 1920 the proportion of Ministers known for their United Empire Loyalist descent was relatively high indicating that, for a considerable period after Confederation it was useful to be known as being of old Loyalist stock. Significantly there has been only one Minister since 1921 who has been known specifically as being of Loyalist stock. Apparently this factor in one's birth no longer serves as any sort of pre-determination of elite status.

The column "Other European" in table 2-4 refers only to men who are first or second generation Canadians or who have suggested in their Who's Who write-ups that they consider themselves as representative of their own ethnic rootstock. J.T. Thorson (Icelandic), Michael Starr (Ukrainian), William Euler (German) qualify here but John Diefenbaker, who in spite of a German name can certainly





be considered thoroughly Canadianized, does not. The same applies to the "other" column of table 2-6 so we can see that proportionately, more members of non-charter ethnic groups get into parliament than get into the Cabinet.

Table 2-5 is taken from census data and "other" here is defined by family name so that "Diefenbaker" would be considered German. Just the same it is true that significantly large ethnic communities such as the prairie Ukrainians or Russian-stock peoples and more significantly the large sections of Italian populations in eastern cities do not receive Cabinet representation. Nor is there any particular evidence that they have ever demanded it.

As far as we are concerned here the most obvious and most important ethnic split is between French and non-French Cabinet members. In general Conservative Prime Ministers have tended to under-represent French Canadians in the Cabinet while the Liberals have tended towards representing them in proportions fairly close to their distribution in the population at large. In the Macdonald Cabinets between 1867 and 1896 very few French ministers appeared and during this period when they constituted about 31% of the Canadian population they received only about 19% of ministerial appointments. To some extent this is due to Macdonald not changing his Quebec ministers very frequently but more importantly it indicates some under-



representation of the French in his cabinets. The Borden and usually the Meighen cabinets also showed a lack of French-Canadian members and most recently, the Diefenbaker cabinet showed a considerably lower proportion of French ministers than did its Liberal successor.

On the Liberal side, Alexander Mackenzie had considerable trouble with his Quebec ministers but he did have a higher proportion of them than Macdonald and since Laurier's time the usual Liberal cabinet has contained something like 27 to 30 per cent French members. A low figure appears in the King era but this is due largely to the fact that King did not change his French ministers very often indicating that in this case, they held more power than they customarily had in the past.

A final point worth reiterating here is that in the present Cabinet 39% of the portfolios are held by French Canadians and 46% of new Cabinet appointees have been French. This is a significant increase over all previous Cabinets and appears to be an attempt to provide a situation whereby French Canadians may be brought closer to numerical parity with English Canadians at the topmost decision-making level in Canada.





The first three tables in Appendix A are also relevant to this Chapter. Table Appendix - 1 indicates that of a total of 86 French ministers showing in this tabulation, seventy-nine, or 92 per cent of them came from Quebec. Three have come from New Brunswick which has a substantial French minority, two from Ontario and one each from Manitoba and Alberta. This indicates that the French outside of Quebec may have a seat in the Cabinet but that this is by no means a regular entitlement. In any case the Ontario French only rarely have a Cabinet Minister and are by no means safe in frequently expecting such representation. The distribution of the French-Canadian population of Canada as a whole, on the other hand, shows that some 23.4 per cent of them did not, in 1961, live in Quebec. This a fairly large minority of Canada's French population and constitutes 7.1% of the entire Canadian population. It is perhaps surprising that it has not been productive of more cabinet posts but this problem is probably best explained by the fact that Quebec Politicians tend to assume that they speak for the rest of Canada's French population as well as that in Quebec and by the fact that many of those of French origin now living outside Quebec are 'denationalized' French. The French outside of Quebec, and especially the Acadian population of New Brunswick have not always accepted this point of view without some qualms but their objections have not been productive of much in the way of Cabinet power.



The English Ministers are distributed about as would be expected with the exception of those from Quebec. Here they have had twenty-nine representatives or 26.8 per cent of all Quebec appointments whereas they have usually constituted only about 20 per cent of the Quebec population. To carry the comparison a step further, the non-French living in Quebec constitute 8.0% of the Canadian population and have held 8.5 per cent of all ministerial appointments. The French living outside of Quebec have usually constituted 6 - 7 per cent of the Canadian population yet have held only 2.3 per cent of ministerial appointments. A few of the English-speaking Quebec ministers have been more broadly representative in that they were intended to speak on behalf of the Irish-Catholic population of Canada as well as English-speaking Quebecers. But the discrepancy between the representation of English in Quebec and French in the rest of Canada still holds true. The non-Quebec French could, perhaps, expect more than they get.

Table Appendix - 3 will not be analyzed in any detail here. It indicates the places of birth of Cabinet ministers according to their ethnic orientation. Seventy-seven



French-Canadian Cabinet Ministers were born in Quebec, three were born in the United States and four in Ontario. On the other hand, thirty-five English-Canadian Cabinet Ministers (or 14 per cent of the total) were born outside of Canada. Most of these, of course, represent provinces west of the Maritimes and Quebec, for in the west the newly settled areas have tended to absorb immigrants who have no compunction about being represented by the non-native born.





TABLE 2-7  
PERIOD (OF MINISTER'S FIRST APPOINTMENT) BY ETHNIC ORIENTATION BY PORTFOLIOS HELD.

Portfolio Period and Ethnic orientation	President of Privy Council	Trade & Commerce	Agriculture	Mines, Resources, Development, Surveys	Secretary of State	Labour	Public Works	Postmaster General	National Defense or Militia	Associate Defense	Solicitor General	Transport	Health and Welfare	Finance	National Revenue	Veterans Affairs
English 1867-1896	14	4	4	0	9	0	4	10	9	0	0	0	0	8	8	0
French	5	0	4	0	3	0	4	4	4	0	0	0	0	0	6	0
English 1896-1921	3	0	2	8	6	6	7	4	6	0	1	1	2	2	3	1
French	0	0	0	4	3	0	1	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	0
English 1921-1948	1	11	5	7	6	9	6	5	11	4	3	1	10	10	7	7
French	1	0	0	0	5	0	2	5	0	0	5	3	0	0	0	1
English 1948-1965	1	4	3	4	5	2	4	1	4	2	4	4	2	4	4	2
French	2	0	0	4	4	0	2	5	0	3	2	1	0	0	0	3
Total English	19	19	14	19	26	17	21	20	30	6	8	4	14	24	22	10
Total French	8	0	4	8	15	0	9	18	4	3	7	5	0	0	13	4
TOTALS	27	19	18	27	41	17	30	38	34	9	15	9	14	24	35	14



	Fisheries	External Affairs	Justice & Attorney General	Reconstruction & Supply	Northern Affairs	Without Portfolio	Citizenship & Immigration	Defense Production & Munitions Supply	Interior	Indian Affairs	Railways & Canal	Prime Minister	Customs	Secretary of State for Prov.	Receiver General	Naval Services	Overseas Forces	National War Services	Vices	Forestry
1948-1965 Fr. Eng.	2	3	3	1	4	9	5	3	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	
1921-1948 Fr. Eng.	6	1	5	0	0	6	0	0	1	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	
1896-1921 Fr. Eng.	9	1	3	1	0	15	6	2	6	3	8	1	4	0	0	0	0	3	1	
1867-1896 Fr. Eng.	5	4	4	0	0	13	1	0	7	5	6	1	4	0	0	4	2	0	0	
1867-1896 Fr. Eng.	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	
Tot. Tot.	32	10	28	2	7	60	13	5	23	19	18	13	16	3	5	4	2	4	3	
Fr. Eng.	9	2	10	0	2	10	1	0	1	1	0	2	3	0	2	1	0	1	1	
Fr. Eng.	23	8	18	2	5	50	12	5	22	18	18	11	13	3	3	4	2	3	2	





### Ethnic Distribution of Portfolios

Table 2-7 indicates the distribution of portfolios between each of the two charter ethnic orientations by period. One major point immediately becomes obvious upon an examination of it -- no French-Canadian Minister has ever held the portfolio of Trade and Commerce or Finance and none has been appointed to National Revenue since before the turn of the century. This fact may be explicable but probably in terms of a partnership of the ethnic groups somewhat less justifiable. These posts seem to go primarily to ministers acceptable to Bay Street or St. James Street and these two financial avenues are not, or were not until very recently, frequented by French Canadians. These posts are traditionally representative of "the Interests" and the French Canadians are not. Yet Finance and Trade and Commerce are generally considered to be two of the most vital posts in the Cabinet and it would seem reasonable if Quebec is to be given significant representation in the Cabinet that she would have access to all of the top posts and not just one or two.

There is some evidence that until recently at least, French-Canadian ministers expressed very little interest in holding any of these posts and the tendency of French-Canadian ministers to be from professional rather than business



ranks further disqualifies them from several important portfolios. Only if and as the characteristics of French ministers change will it be possible to determine if the custom of staffing several of the top ministerial posts with English M.P.'s has hardened sufficiently over time to become a general rule.

Other points can be made about this table as well. There has never been a French Canadian from Quebec as Minister of Health and Welfare nor of Labour and aside from the associate Minister post, Quebec has also been out of national defense since before the first war. These facts again may be explicable; until recently Quebec was antipathetic to social welfare measures and could not expect to be given Health and Welfare (or its welfare antecedent, Pensions) and the same can be said for Labour, for again until recently Labour unions have been largely ignored by Quebec's elite. The lack of postings to Defense Ministries was a direct hangover from the two conscription crises. But it would probably be unwise if these rules of the past are considered to be iron-bound laws for they seem at present to relegate the Quebec delegation to a series of second rate portfolios in the Cabinet which cannot help but diminish the effective voice of the French Canadians in the highest Councils of Canada.





In some posts the French have been adequately and even over-represented, but aside from the Ministry of Justice these portfolios, such as Secretary of State or Postmaster General, are of secondary importance and do not lend a very effective voice to their incumbents, for their departments carry less weight in the overall determination of government policy than do ministries like Trade and Commerce or Finance. This would appear to be a form of hidden under-representation of the French-Canadian which can only be solved by a process of political negotiation and infighting, but in terms of the general decision-making value of the Cabinet it might be hoped that these conventions are not considered to be iron-bound rules.

In conclusion it might be pointed out that the idea of federal representation in the Cabinet is largely borne out by this investigation as we expected it would be. The one province -- one Cabinet Member rule appears to hold fairly true (although it certainly is affected by many other factors) with the significant exceptions of Ontario and Quebec and the historical exceptions of the Maritimes. There also has been, up to about 1920, a significant attempt to represent Scottish, Irish, English and French stock in the Cabinet in rough proportion to their numbers in the country





but since 1920 the tendency seems to have been to consider French as one group to be represented and to lump together the rest of the Canadian people into a sort of English-Canadian oriented whole. This would seem to indicate a significant political merging of all of our non-French races into one stock thought of as simply English-Canadian.

There are, then, two significant exceptions to the principle of federal-ethnic representation. These are the extremely uneven distribution of portfolios between English and French Canadians and the significant under-representation of the French outside of Quebec. Both of these points might be borne in consideration by any Prime Minister interested in providing significantly better representation for the French in the highest decision-making body in Canada.



## CHAPTER III

## THE SOCIAL BACKGROUNDS OF CABINET MINISTERS

Until now this report has been concerned mainly with what might be called the "surface determinants" of Cabinet construction. Determinants such as the province from which a Minister comes or his ethnic origins are quite obvious to anyone who looks at a list of Cabinet Minister's names and constituencies. But many other factors go into the choice of Ministers -- political experience, party loyalty and as we shall see shortly the correct educational and social background. Not all of these things may be evident even to the Prime Minister who picks the Cabinet. It is doubtful, for example, if any Prime Minister ever sat down and decided that 65% of the Cabinet should be lawyers and that 21% of his Ministers should have gone to an English-speaking private school. He is probably only aware on a more subtle level that certain men "fit" with the others in his Cabinet and that certain others do not. With the federal determinants being equal, it will be the man that "fits" who will get the job. It is our task during the next two





chapters to determine what social and political factors may especially suit a man to fit into the cabinet atmosphere and hence to determine what factors other than geography may differentiate him from his fellow Members of Parliament and from the rest of Canadians.

In this chapter the concern is with the social backgrounds of Cabinet Ministers. In turn, the Educational Religious and Occupational standings of Cabinet Ministers will be examined. The main objective is to examine differences and similarities between Ministers drawn from English or French-Canadian milieus<sup>11</sup> but comparisons will also be made between Ministers and ordinary Members of Parliament and between Ministers and the general population. The following chapter will examine the pre and post-Cabinet political careers of Cabinet Ministers.

### Educational Backgrounds of Cabinet Ministers

#### (i) General Levels

Table 3 - 1 shows the highest level of education achieved by Ministers of either English or French cultural orientations for four periods since Confederation. The most obvious point about this table is that, especially prior to the Second War, the French-Canadian Ministers



have had a substantially higher level of education than have the English. Over the entire ninety-eight years since Confederation, only 7.9% of French-Canadian Ministers have not gone beyond collège classique whereas 26.2% of English-speaking Ministers had not gone beyond secondary school. Moreover, very few French Canadians have stopped at the university undergraduate level; 79.6% of them have gone on to some form (usually law) of specialized training whereas only 56.7% of English Ministers have followed a similar path.

But the total figures from 1867 to 1965 are rather deceptive for they hide the fact that over time French and English-speaking Ministers have tended to become educationally more alike. Whereas, between 1867 and 1896 40.6% of English Ministers did not go beyond secondary school (compared to only one French Minister who did not go beyond collège classique), by the post-war period this proportion had dropped to 9.4%. The educational level of French Ministers has remained uniformly high over the period since 1867 while that of English-speaking Ministers has risen to meet it.



Table 3-1

EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENTS OF CABINET MINISTERS  
BY PERIOD & ETHNIC ORIENTATION  
(FIGURES IN PERCENTAGES)

Highest Educational Level Attained Ethnic Orientation & Period	No Formal Education	Elementary (or Grammar) School	Secondary School	Collège Classique	University	Post Graduate Training	Law	Other or N/A	Total No. of Fr. Attending Collèges Classiques	Total in Row
1863 - 1896 English French	1.6 0	15.6 0	23.4 0	0 5.0	3.1 0	9.4 10.0	42.2 75.0	3.1 10.0	- 95.0	63 20
1896 - 1921 English French	2.2 0	11.1 0	8.9 0	0 7.1	17.8 0	11.1 7.1	46.7 71.4	2.2 14.3	- 92.9	45 14
1921 - 1948 English French	0 0	15.1 3.4	12.8 3.4	0 3.4	11.6 6.9	11.6 6.9	45.3 75.9	3.5 0	- 75.9	86 29
1948 - 1965 English French	0 0	1.9 0	7.5 0	0 8.0	24.5 16.0	17.0 12.0	45.3 60.0	3.8 4.0	- 84.0	51 25
Totals since 1867 English French All	0.8 0 0.6	11.7 1.1 9.0	13.7 1.1 10.5	0 5.7 1.5	13.3 6.8 11.7	12.1 9.1 11.4	44.8 70.5 52.2	3.2 5.7 3.1	- 85.2 -	245 88 333





Table Appendix - 4 compares Liberal and Conservative Cabinet Ministers by period since Confederation to determine if there are significant educational differences between them. A quick glance at the table will indicate that there are virtually no differences in educational level between Ministers from either major party. The Alexander Mackenzie Cabinet (see "Liberal 1867 - 1896") had the lowest educational level of any since Confederation with 43.5% of its Members having only secondary school education or less, while Macdonald's Cabinets of that era had 24.8% of their Ministers with secondary education or less, but that is the only case where one party differed significantly from the other in the educational level of its Cabinet Ministers. The point here, then, is the very remarkable similarities between parties indicating that as far as the intellectual capabilities and predilections of party leaders are concerned there is very little to choose between them.

Statistics on the general level of education of the Canadian population are not readily available especially before the First World War but it is a safe (if rather trite) conclusion that the educational level of Cabinet Ministers is far higher than that of the general population. A more interesting comparison can be made,



however, between the general level of education of Members of Parliament and of the Cabinet Ministers selected from them. Data again is not readily available but some does appear in Table Appendix - 5. While 38.4% of Members of Parliament have had no university training, only 21.6% of all Cabinet Ministers are in a similar position. The data in Table Appendix - 5 also suggests that as many as 20.1% of Members of Parliament may have been university drop-outs whereas there was no evidence that this had happened to more than an insignificant few Cabinet Ministers. Only 41.4% of ordinary Members of Parliament have obtained degrees, whereas if we count all lawyers among the Cabinet Ministers, 75.3% had actually received a degree or its equivalent. This information would indicate that a Member of Parliament's chances of receiving a portfolio are vastly enhanced if his educational level is higher than that of his fellows.

(ii) Pre-university Education

Table 3 - 2 indicates by period and ethnic orientation, the type of pre-university training of Cabinet Ministers. Most of its indications are about as would be expected. Save for the period 1867 - 1896 most of the English-speaking Cabinet Ministers were educated in





Table 3-2

TYPE OF PRE-UNIVERSITY TRAINING  
BY PERIOD & ETHNIC ORIENTATION  
(FIGURES IN PERCENTAGES)

Type of Elementary schooling Period & Ethnic orientation	None	Local Public	Private Tutor	English Private School	College Classique	N/A & Other	Total Number in Row
1867-1896 English French	1.6 0	40.6 0	0 0	39.1 0	1.6 95.0	17.2 5.0	6 20
1896-1921 English French	2.2 0	53.3 0	0 0	28.9 0	6.7 92.9	8.9 7.1	45 14
1921-1948 English French	0 0	61.6 10.3	1.2 3.4	26.7 3.4	1.2 75.9	9.3 6.9	86 29
1948-1965 English French	0 0	58.5 12.0	0 0	26.4 0	0 84.0	15.1 4.0	51 25
Total since 1867 English French	0.8 0	54.0 6.8	0.4 1.1	30.2 1.1	2.0 85.2	11.7 5.7	245 88



public non-sectarian schools, only one English and one French Minister was educated by private tutor and only two (of 245) English Ministers were without formal education. No French minister has ever been without formal education. It is on the three columns "local public", "English private school" and "Collège Classique" that we must concentrate our attention here.

In only one period did the attendance at English-speaking private school rival that at public school. That was in 1867 to 1896 when the numbers attending each type of institution were substantially the same. Attendance at private school then dropped to 28.9% of English ministers in the period 1896 - 1921 and has remained around that level since. The high attendance in private schools for the first period is readily explicable for in the period 1820 to 1860 when most of these ministers were being educated, attendance at private school was not necessarily any indication of membership in the elite but rather was the logical thing to do if any money could be spared, for the standard of public elementary education in Canada was none too high. Subsequent to about 1900, however, private-school educations became less common and the fact that 26.4% of post-war English ministers had attended private schools



is definitely a factor which differentiates them from the general population. A private-school education would seem to be some aid in gaining a cabinet post but the generalization must not be taken too far for 73.6% of post-war English-oriented Cabinet Ministers made it to the Cabinet without such training.

With a total of 30.2% of English Cabinet Ministers coming from private schools, the question then arises: are certain of these schools better than others for access to the top rung of our political elite? The answer, from Table Appendix - 7, would seem to be no. The private school with the most Cabinet Ministers is Upper Canada College, but it has had only 10 - 13.3% of the total attending private school and only 3.0% of all Cabinet Ministers. The rest of Canada's "ranking" private schools have very few Cabinet members and such names as Ridley or Kings College School have none at all. Fifty-nine of the seventy-five who did attend such schools appear in the "other" category indicating that they were educated at small local private schools. There cannot be said to be any significant "old-boy" network leading to Cabinet position.





The other column of interest in Table 3 - 2 is "collège classique". Here we see that 85.2% of French-speaking Cabinet ministers have had a classical college education. the proportion ranging from 75.9 between 1921 and 1948 to 95.0 in the first post-Confederation Cabinets. The five English ministers with such education have been mainly from Quebec and were bilingual ministers from English-speaking homes. But the major question these statistics bring to mind is what is the effect of this enormous bias in favour of a classical education on the decision-making predilections of the ministers? The answer can only be speculative, but it would seem likely to lead to a rather conservative and possibly, where applicable, rather clerically oriented bias in decision making. At any rate this figure is no doubt indicative of the great value that a classical education held for advancement in Quebec political society. Whether or not this value holds true today is at present an unanswerable question, which must await the next generation of Quebec politicians.



Given the huge bias in favour of a classical education, the question then naturally arises: are some collèges classiques better than others if one is to advance in the political elite? The answer, from Table Appendix - 6 would seem to be a qualified yes. Between 1867 and 1921 it definitely was advantageous to have been educated at St. Hyacinthe, Nicolet or Quebec Seminaries but since 1921 the distribution of colleges for ministers has become much more even with only the Séminaire de Québec showing a significantly large number of ministers among its graduate. While it was formerly useful to have attended the "right" college it no longer seems to matter a great deal.

### (iii) University Training

We have already discussed the relative numbers of French and English oriented Cabinet members who have attended university during various periods since Confederation. Tables 3 - 3 and 3 - 4 indicate the universities actually attended by the ministers in an attempt to determine whether any particular universities are more likely to "fit" a man for cabinet postings than are others. Table 3 - 3 indicates the university attended for undergraduate training.





Table 3-3

UNIVERSITY OF UNDERGRADUATE TRAINING BY PERIOD  
(FIGURES IN PERCENTAGES\*)

University Attended Period	Laval	Toronto	McGill	Manitoba	Montreal	U. N.B.	Dalhousie	Ottawa	Queen's	Other Canadian	British	American	Total N in Row	% Not Attending Univer- sity	Total N of Minis- ters in Period
1867- 1896	13.0	17.4	26.1	0	0	8.7	0	0	0	13.0	13.0	8.7	23	72.9	85
1896- 1921	24.4	24.4	7.3	4.9	0	4.9	2.5	2.5	4.9	17.1	2.4	4.9	41	31.7	60
1921- 1948	22.4	15.3	7.1	3.5	2.4	3.5	5.9	3.5	2.4	28.2	4.7	1.2	85	26.1	105
1948- 1965	11.8	17.7	2.9	10.3	10.3	1.5	2.9	4.4	4.4	32.4	1.5	0	68	12.8	78
Totals	18.4	17.9	7.8	5.5	4.1	3.7	3.7	3.2	3.2	25.8	4.1	2.3	217	35.8	338

\* Expressed as percentage of those attending university.



Laval leads the field as the ranking university of French Canada with 40 ministers having attended it for undergraduate work. This is almost half of the eighty-eight French Cabinet Ministers and indicates a rather significant tendency for French Ministers to be concentrated among Laval graduates. Significantly, the University of Montreal has, in the post-war period, had almost as many of its graduates in the Cabinet as has Laval, an indication that Laval's position as the training ground of the political elite is far from secure.

Among English-speaking universities the situation is considerably less clear-cut. Toronto leads with thirty-nine graduates, but this is only 17.9% of those attending university and only 15.9% of all English-speaking ministers. McGill is second with less than half as many ministers and no other school has had a disproportionate share of its graduates in the Cabinet. It is interesting to note, however, that Manitoba, a relative newcomer, has had more of its graduates in the Cabinet than many of our older and possibly better-known universities. Finally, it does not seem to pay to leave Canada for an undergraduate education. Only 6.4% of ministers were trained outside of Canada; and only 4.1% were schooled in Britain.



Table 3-4

UNIVERSITY OF GRADUATE TRAINING BY PERIOD  
(FIGURES IN PERCENTAGES)\*

Univer- sity Attended Period	Laval	Dalhousie	Montreal	Osgoode	McGill	Toronto	Manitoba	Other Canadian	Oxford	Other British	American	Other	Total N in Row	% Not Doing Post Grad. Training	Total N of Ministers in Period.
1867- 1896	16.7	0	0	0	16.7	16.7	0	8.4	0	8.4	25.0	8.3	12	85.9	85
1896- 1921	25.0	0	0	12.5	6.3	12.5	0	25.0	0	6.3	12.5	0	16	68.3	60
1921- 1948	19.2	15.4	3.8	25.0	5.8	1.9	5.8	0	11.5	5.8	5.8	0	52	50.4	105
1948- 1965	12.0	6.0	16.0	18.0	2.0	2.0	6.0	4.0	14.0	4.0	10.0	6.0	50	33.3	78
Totals	17.2	8.6	7.8	18.8	5.5	4.7	3.1	5.5	10.2	5.5	10.2	3.1	125	58.6	338

\* Expressed as Percentage of those attending graduate school.





Table 3 - 4 shows the school where graduate university training was undertaken. Laval again is the leading school with twenty-two ministers having undertaken graduate training there. This is 17.2% of all ministers who undertook graduate training and 25% of all French ministers. Osgoode Hall has actually had more ministers attend it, but it is included here, like Dalhousie only because of its law school and therefore constitutes a somewhat special case. Among other Canadian Universities only Montreal has had any significant number of ministers chosen from among its graduate students. McGill, Toronto, Manitoba and the other Canadian graduate schools rank well behind.

It is worth noting that 10.2% of those ministers who attended graduate school did so at Oxford. Thirteen ministers out of one hundred and twenty-eight is not a vast number but there is some evidence for believing that it constitutes an advantage to be an Oxonian in the race for Cabinet posts. A further 10.2% attended American graduate schools and 5.5% went to other British universities; -- mainly to Edinburgh for medicine. While it is uncommon for Canadian ministers to have taken external undergraduate training it is by no means unusual for



those who have gone on to graduate school to have been trained abroad and it would appear to be a positive advantage to have gone to Oxford.

To sum up, then, there cannot be said to be a "right" university for English Canadians to have attended should they aspire to ministerial office in the sense that Oxford is the "right" university in England. At the graduate level it would appear to have been an advantage even for Canadians to have attended Oxford but the numbers are by no means large enough to allow for any degree of statistical certainty on this point. For French Canadians, Laval was undoubtedly the school to have attended at least to 1945, but then this is hardly surprising for until the fairly recent rapid growth of Université de Montréal, Laval was the only French-speaking university of any size in Canada. The tendency of the French-Canadian political elite to be educated at home, however, is indicated by the fact that only two out of thirty-eight future ministers who undertook graduate training went to France, a number equalled by two English-speaking ministers who did the same thing.





Table 3-5

\*

RELIGIOUS AFFILIATIONS OF ENGLISH-ORIENTED MINISTERS BY PERIOD  
(FIGURES IN PERCENTAGES)

Religion Period	Roman Catholic	Anglican	Pres- byterian	Methodist & United Church	Other Christian	Non- Christian	Not Available	Total N in Row
1867-1896	14.1	21.9	28.1	9.4	20.3	0	6.3	64
1896-1921	11.4	25.0	20.5	34.1	9.1	0	0	44
1921-1948	9.4	27.1	21.2	30.6	11.8	0	0	85
1948-1965	13.5	17.3	13.5	40.4	13.5	1.9	0	52
Totals	11.4	23.3	21.2	27.8	13.9	0.4	1.6	245

\* Of the 88 French ministers since Confederation only 1 was not Roman Catholic.  
He was an Anglican.



### The Religions of Cabinet Ministers

Table 3 - 5 indicates the religious denominations of English Cabinet members for the usual four periods since Confederation. Eighty-seven of the eighty-eight French ministers have been Catholic, a fact which hardly needs further discussion or emphasis here. Among the English ministers there has been aside from the 11.4% who were Catholics, a very equal partition of ministerial posts among the three major denominations. Of the Anglican, Presbyterian and United Churches<sup>1</sup> the latter has had the most Cabinet posts, being the faith of 27.8% of English ministers while the Anglicans have constituted 23.3% of the Cabinet and the Presbyterians some 21.2%. Over time the proportion of ministers who have been United Church members has risen fairly steadily, the proportion of Presbyterians has dropped and the proportion of Anglicans rose to a peak of 28.5% of English ministers between 1921 and 1945

- 
1. United Church also refers to those Churches which banded together to form the United Church of Canada with the exception of the Presbyterians. These were basically the Methodist, and Congregationalist groups. It is interesting to note that the proportion of Presbyterian ministers does not drop substantially in the 1921-1948 period in spite of the fact that over half the Presbyterian church joined the United Church in this period. This may indicate either a conservative bias in Cabinet ministers, or more likely perhaps a time lag in the Parliamentary Guides and Who's Whos in keeping up with changes in status of Cabinet ministers.





and then has fallen sharply since the war. Other religious groups have never been the faiths of more than a small minority of Cabinet ministers except in the 1867 - 1896 period when some 20.3% of English ministers are found in the "Christian - other" category.

These figures can be made to mean a little more when they are compared to those in Tables 3 - 6 and 3 - 7 showing the religious distribution of the population at large and the rest of Members of Parliament between Confederation and the present. We will compare the Cabinet ministers to each of these in turn.

Turning first to Table 3 - 6 we see that the proportion of Roman Catholics in the general population has remained fairly steadily between 40 and 44% with a low of 38.7% and a high of 45.7%. Similarly while the proportion of French ministers who were Catholic has always been 100% or nearly so, the proportion of English Catholic ministers has varied only between 9.4% and 14.1% with the low corresponding roughly to the low period in the general population. The Catholics have always been slightly under-represented in the Cabinet, their overall proportion of Cabinet seats being 34.8% while their mean proportion of the population has been about 41.5%. This is largely due to the custom of giving only one or two posts in each Cabinet to English-speaking Catholics.





Table 3-6  
RELIGIOUS DISTRIBUTIONS IN CANADA BY PERIOD  
(FIGURES IN PERCENTAGES)

Period	(1) 1871	(2) 1881	(3) 1891	(4) 1901	(4) 1911	(4) 1921	(4) 1931	(4) 1941	(4) 1951	(4) 1961
Religion										
Catholic	42.8	41.4	41.2	41.7	39.4	38.7	39.5	41.8	43.3	45.7
Anglican	14.2	13.3	13.4	12.8	14.5	16.1	15.8	15.2	14.7	13.2
Presbyterian	15.6	15.6	15.6	15.8	15.6	16.1	8.4	7.2	5.6	4.5
United Church*	16.9	17.8	18.1	17.5	15.6	13.6	19.5	19.2	20.5	20.1
Protestant, Other**	9.0	9.0	8.8	7.9	8.9	8.0	8.9	8.8	8.3	8.4
Other or N/A	1.0	2.9	2.9	4.1	6.0	7.1	8.8	7.8	7.7	8.1
Total N in 3 Column X10	3689.3	4324.8	4833.2	5371.3	7286.6	8787.9	10376.8	11506.7	14009.3	18238.2

\* Before 1931 mainly Methodists, after 1931 Methodists, Congregationalists & some Presbyterians.

\*\* Mainly Baptist & Lutheran

- (1) Canada Census, 1871, V.I pp. 246-50 (adapted)
- (2) Canada Census, 1881, V.I pp. 282-3 (adapted)
- (3) Canada Census, 1891, V.I pp. 224-5 (adapted)
- (4) Canada Census, 1961, V.I, Part 2, Bul. 6, Table 41 (adapted)



The Anglican denomination on the other hand has always been somewhat over-represented in the Cabinet. The percentage of Anglicans in the population has varied from 12.8 to 16.1 percent yet their share of Cabinet postings has never been less than 17.3%. To some extent this may be considered a vindication of the idea that there may be an Anglican establishment in Canadian politics but before jumping to this conclusion let us examine the representation of the other major non-Catholic denominations.

When this is done the idea of an Anglican establishment, at least insofar as the highest level of our political elite is concerned, evaporates. The Presbyterians remained around a steady 15.6% of our population from 1867 until 1921 yet they always held at least 20% of the English Cabinet portfolios and between 1867 and 1896, perhaps due to the domination of Canadian politics by the Ontario and Nova Scotian Scots, they gained 28.1% of English ministerial appointments. Since the division of their Church into the Independent Presbyterian and the group that joined the United Church, their proportion of the Canadian population has fallen steadily to less than 5% yet even since the war they have held 13.5% of English Cabinet posts.





The United Church and earlier the Methodists and Congregationalists have constituted from 13.6% to 20.1% of the Canadian population yet since 1896 they have not held less than 30.6% of English ministerial posts and since the war fully 40.4% of English Cabinet Ministers have been United Church of Canada members.

This historical evidence on cabinet structure tends to back up the assertions on the religious composition of the Canadian political elite made by John Porter in The Vertical Mosaic.<sup>2</sup> What, in fact, seems to happen is this. The English-speaking Catholics are very substantially under-represented, the assumption presumably being that the French Cabinet ministers form a solid Catholic Phalanx and are sufficient representation for that Church. All Protestant denominations are then over-represented in the Cabinet but the Anglicans are over-represented least. Before about 1900 the Presbyterians were most significantly over-represented but this claim can now be made for the United Church. If any Church could be said to constitute an elite Church for Cabinet appointments it must be the United Church with the Presbyterians and Anglicans following in order.

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2. See John Porter, The Vertical Mosaic, pp. 389-90.



Table 3-7

RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION OF NEW MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT BY PERIOD  
(FIGURES IN PERCENTAGES)<sup>1</sup>

Religion Period	Roman Catholic	Anglican	Presbyterian	United Church & Methodist	Other	Total N in Row
1867 - 1899	66.7	10.5	11.3	7.6	4.0	354
1900 - 1921	27.0	16.2	28.2	22.7	4.3	585
1922 - 1945	33.9	16.4	12.7	32.5	4.5	575
1946 - 1964	44.1	14.9	5.7	26.4	8.9	542
TOTALS	40.1	15.4	15.0	23.8	5.5	2056

<sup>1</sup> Data adapted from figures provided by R.R. March.



Turning now to Table 3 - 7 showing the religious affiliations of Members of Parliament we see that here the distribution is considerably closer to that of the Canadian population. The population seems to vote for its co-religionists, but once these men are in Parliament and the time comes to choose the Cabinet the purely equitable distribution of posts by religious denomination is lost. The evidence indicates not so much that there is a great religious factor in cabinet selection in Canada, but rather that what appears to be an attempt at religious distribution of Cabinet posts may be in fact a by-product of several other factors. Firstly the geographical and ethnic bases of Cabinet distribution dictate that a reasonably constant Catholic/Protestant ratio will prevail. Secondly, among the Protestant Members of Parliament there is a distribution of denominations not unlike that of the general population either as a result of persons voting on the basis of religion or, more likely because so long as he goes to Church the denomination of a Protestant Member of Parliament is not a vital factor. Thirdly, if a Prime Minister then chooses his Cabinet Ministers on some basis such as geographical distribution there will be some random fluctuation among the numbers assigned to each religious denomination especially since the Cabinet is a small group





picked from a small population. It is probably these random fluctuations which we see here. If there is an elite religious denomination it is, as we have seen, the United Church of Canada but the evidence is really too thin to conclude that this is so.<sup>3</sup>

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3. We are prisoners of the size of our population here. The proper way to test this hypothesis is to correlate provincial representation and Cabinet membership on the one hand and religious denomination with Cabinet membership on the other. With a population of only 341 and many celled tables however, such correlations are rejected as insignificant and we are thrown back on previous knowledge and simple observation. Using these tools I think the final hypothesis presented above is the most convincing but I have no statistical right to claim its validity.

The whole question has probably arisen, because Alexander Mackenzie once congratulated himself on a nearly perfect religious distribution in his Cabinet:

"I may, with feelings of pride, refer to the standing of the members of the Cabinet ... In the matter of religious faith there are five Catholics, three members of the Church of England, three Presbyterians, two Methodists, one Congregationalist, and one Baptist."

Buckingham and Ross, Life of Honourable Alexander Mackenzie, p. 354

But later he said:

"I have no sympathy personally with the feeling that appears to be growing ... that every available place should be filled in accordance with the religious views of certain portions of our population."

Mackenzie, Papers, VI, p. 121, quoted in Norman Rogers, "Federal Influences in the Canadian Cabinet", p. 108.

Were a Prime Minister to notice a vast discrepancy in the distribution of denominations in his Cabinet, he would probably move to correct it but it is unlikely he would consciously set out to balance the Protestant denominations in the first instance. Certain students of the Cabinet may have been overly impressed with Mackenzie's statement and have applied it rather blindly to subsequent Cabinets.



Two tables presented in the appendix constitute an interesting corollary to this section. The first of these is Table Appendix - 8 which indicates the religious distribution of Cabinet Memberships by Party and period. The figures in this table fluctuate a great deal and indicate that there are no very firm party traditions in this respect. The Liberals have appointed slightly more Catholics to Cabinet posts than have the Conservatives and substantially more Anglicans while the Conservatives in turn have appointed substantially more Presbyterians (mainly in John A. MacDonald's day) and more United Church members. When these figures are looked at over time they seem to form no real pattern and suggest that apart from a more or less standard Catholic-Protestant split at about 34.5% Catholic, the probable denomination of ministers cannot be predicted other than within extremely broad limits by examining the biases of the major parties in this respect.

Finally, Table Appendix - 9 was included to test the hypothesis that Catholic Prime Ministers might tend to appoint more of their co-religionists to the Cabinet and that the same would be true for Protestant Prime Ministers. In fact the table indicates that the opposite





is true. Ministerial appointments by Catholic Prime Ministers were 29.8% Catholic while those by Protestant Prime Ministers were 36.5% Catholic. The discrepancy is not great enough to suggest that Prime Ministers lean over the other way to appoint men who are not on their own side of the religious fence but it does negate any idea of appointment by religious similarity.

To sum up this section, then, there is a fairly high comparability (I avoid the word correlation) between the distribution of religious denominations in the general population and in the cabinet. But the fact that the degree of comparability between the population and the Members of Parliament is extremely high and that this high comparability is not entirely carried over into the cabinet suggests that aside from broad Protestant-Catholic considerations the denomination of a minister is not a really vital factor. The population from which the Prime Minister chooses his Cabinet numbers -- that is the Members of Parliament -- is more religiously representative than the Cabinet, we have therefore lost a degree of representation in the selection of Cabinet Ministers. Were denomination a major determinant we could not expect this loss to occur and the conclusion must be that within certain limits the religious structure of the Cabinet varies in favour of other variables.



### Occupational Backgrounds of Cabinet Ministers

In Canada where there is no widely recognized criterion of social class other than economic status and occupation the position held in private life by a Cabinet Member can best be gauged by his non-political occupation. By the time a man becomes a Cabinet Minister he may well have been in politics long enough that the skills of his original means of livelihood are all but forgotten but he is still generally known by this occupation. No Cabinet Minister has ever been classed in the Parliamentary Guides or the Who's Whos as being a "politician". We may, therefore, assume that the major non-political occupation of the Cabinet Minister still has some validity since this is how he is known to the public.

As well as being an index of the social background from which the highest level of the political elite in both our cultures is drawn, we might expect occupation to provide some indication of the types of "interests" represented in the Cabinet. This statement seems plausible at first but it is not for the vast majority of Cabinet Ministers from both of our cultures are lawyers and the information we need to know to determine what





"interests" are represented in the ministry is for whom these men were lawyers. At first glance, for example, it would appear that no railroad man ever sat in the Cabinet, but in fact several of the lawyers have had railways as their major clients in private life. Yet it is just about impossible to find out what interests Ministers have represented at this level. An attempt was made to discover secondary and tertiary fields of interest for Cabinet members but it was not successful and the results are not presented here. With the fact in mind, then, that our data do not permit us to say very exactly what major economic interests were represented indirectly in the Cabinet, even though we will attempt some guesses in that direction, we can go on to an examination of the occupational data about Cabinet Ministers.

Table 3 - 8 again divides the Cabinet Ministers according to period and ethnic orientation to compare French and English ministers in an historical context. Also for this discussion reference is made to Table 3 - 1 where the number of ministers trained as lawyers according to ethnic orientation and period is indicated in the fourth column from the left. Two points strike home immediately on examining these two tabulations. One is the great preponderance of professionally trained men in the Cabinet and





Table 3-8

MAJOR NON-POLITICAL OCCUPATIONS OF CABINET  
MINISTERS BY PERIOD & ETHNIC ORIENTATION  
(FIGURES IN PERCENTAGES)

Occupation Period & Ethnic Orientation	Profes- sional	Merchan- dising*	Manu- facturing *	Service* Industry	Financial	Public Service	Agric- ulture	Labour	Other	Total N in Row
1867 - 1896 English French	56.3 90.0	28.1 5.0	1.6 0	4.7 0	3.1 0	0.0 5.0	6.3 0	0 0	0 0	63 20
1896 - 1921 English French	63.0 92.9	10.9 0	6.5 0	0 0	4.3 0	4.3 0	4.3 7.1	2.2 0	4.3 0	45 14
1921 - 1948 English French	55.8 93.1	10.5 0	5.8 0	1.2 0	5.8 0	3.5 3.4	14.0 3.4	3.5 0	0 0	86 29
1948 - 1965 English French	58.5 72.0	15.1 12.0	9.4 0	1.9 0	3.8 4.0	5.7 12.0	3.8 0	0 0	1.9 0	51 25
1867 - 1965 English French	57.8 86.4	16.1 4.5	5.6 0	2.0 0	4.4 1.1	3.2 5.7	8.0 2.3	1.6 0	1.2 0	245 88
TOTALS	65.3	13.1	4.2	1.5	3.6	3.9	6.5	1.2	0.9	333

\* Managerial or proprietarial positions.



the other is the fact that the French-Canadian ministers have shown far more bias in this direction than have the English. The proportion of English professionals has usually varied from 55 to 60% while among French ministers and with the very significant exception of the post-war period it has always been 90 to 95%. This is a useful indication of the vast esteem formerly (and, to a fairly large extent it appears, still) given to the professional man in Quebec and is similarly a measure of the low repute in which the commercial career was held. When over 90% of a political elite is recruited from such a small proportion of the population it is indeed a safe assumption that the road to the top is a rather narrow one and that in Quebec, at least until the post-war era and to a large extent still, to succeed in Federal politics one had better be a professional. Of the professions, law is, for the politically oriented, still the reigning king with 60% of French ministers since the war being lawyers. Before the war the proportion never fell below 70%.

The over-representation of the professions is also endemic, it appears, among English ministers but not to such a degree that we are safe in calling the upper political elite a closed shop. The proportion of English ministers chosen from among lawyers is still extremely high,





remaining at a steady 45%, but other professions contribute 10 to 13% of our ministers and non-professional men have some, if something less than equal chance of getting into the cabinet. Aside from the professions and taking first English ministers, the merchandising trades have always had a substantial representation and the manufacturers, as Canada has become more industrialized have slowly increased their representation from 1.6 to 9.4% of English ministerial posts. The service industries have a negligible representation and Finance and Insurance seems to hold a steady, if small, portion of cabinet seats. The public service and labour have a generally negligible representation and agriculture in relation to its economic importance and the number of seats that have been basically rural, has been steadily under-represented.

The huge bias in favour of the professions on the part of French ministers makes a discussion of other occupations somewhat irrelevant but one point is worth emphasizing. That is the very significant decrease in the representation of the professions in the period since 1948 and indicates an apparent tendency to recognize other routes than the professions and especially law into the upper political elite. Thus of the 12% of the professionals since 1948 who have not been lawyers, several have



been university teachers. For the first time since Confederation, French businessmen have been accepted into the cabinet and three of the last twenty-five French appointees have been from the public service. While it is too soon to make any sweeping assertion it is at least safe to suggest tentatively that the French representation in the Cabinet is becoming slightly more representative of the cross-currents of French-Canadian life. Even if it becomes identical, as far as occupational structure is concerned, with the English-Canadian membership of the Cabinet it will still show a heavy professional bias but at least the routes to the top in French-Canadian politics appear to be becoming slightly more open.

This is not to assert that the routes to the top are blocked off in Canada as they may be in older, more class conscious, societies. The Cabinet is drawn from what basically amounts to the upper middle class, and the upper middle class is still open to some degree to anyone from below who will push himself through university, law or medical school. The barriers are high but they are not insurmountable and we would not be entirely justified in suggesting that in either society the political elite is blocked to people from below.



Table 3-9

MAJOR OCCUPATIONS OF MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT, 1867-1945<sup>1</sup>  
(FIGURES IN PERCENTAGES)

Occupation Period	Professional	Merchant- dist	Mining & Manu- facturing	Service & Trans- portation	Finance & Insurance	Public Service	Agri- culture	Labour	Other	Total N in Row	Lawyers *
1867 - 1895	37.7	15.2	8.6	13.3	11.1	2.2	7.9	0	4.5	2285	19.5
1896 - 1920	40.5	14.5	14.1	5.2	7.4	1.3	12.1	0.5	3.4	1936	25.6
1921 - 1945	42.4	11.4	10.9	3.0	7.6	1.7	17.8	1.3	3.8	2208	24.9 ***

<sup>1</sup> Data adapted from Normal Ward, The Canadian House of Commons, p. 132. Data refers to all members elected during period not just new members.

\* Also included under "professional".

\*\* Since 1945, 41.4% of new M.P.'s have been lawyers. Data supplied by R.R. March.





The data just discussed can be thrown into further relief by comparing it with that in Table 3 - 9, indicating the occupational structure of the House of Commons and Tables Appendix - 10 and Appendix - 11 giving occupational data for the whole Canadian labour force. Here the huge bias in favour of the professions is brought into further relief. They have constituted only 38 - 42% of all members of Parliament yet they have occupied far more of ministerial posts. Unfortunately Norman Ward's data, used here, goes only to 1945 but presumably the trends it indicates can be extrapolated at least roughly into the post-war era and the over-representation of the professions continues. The fact that on the average 65.5% of Cabinet Ministers have been professionals while only 40% of Members of Parliament have been so is too large a discrepancy to ignore and suggests that the professionally oriented man and especially the lawyer "fits" far more easily into the mold of an institution devoted basically to drawing legislative plans.



The columns of Tables Appendix - 10 and Appendix - 11 with which we are especially concerned are those showing numbers and percentages of "professional" and "proprietary and managerial" personnel in the population. Aside from farmers and labourers who have usually been a negligible proportion of Cabinet Ministers, all portfolios have been filled from these classes. Yet we can see that combined they have never been more than 17.6% of our labour force and the professions themselves have ranged from 3.8% of our population (from 1871 to 1911) to 9.8% today. Any suggestion that the Cabinet is intended to be occupationally representative of the Canadian population, then, must be rejected as spurious.





Table 3-10

NON-POLITICAL OCCUPATIONS OF CABINET MINISTERS  
BY PARTY & PERIOD  
(FIGURES IN PERCENTAGES)

Occupation Party & Period	Profes- sional	Merchan- dising	Manu- facturing	Service Industry	Finance & Insurance	Public Service	Agric- ulture	Labour	Other	Total N in Row
1867 - 1896 Con.* Lib.	66.1 60.3	22.6 21.7	1.6 0	1.6 8.7	1.6 4.3	1.6 0	4.8 4.3	0 0	0 0	62 23
1896 - 1921 Con. Lib.	63.3 76.7	3.3 13.3	10.0 0	0 0	6.7 0	6.7 0	3.3 6.7	3.3 0	3.3 3.3	30 30
1921 - 1948 Con. Lib.	61.7 67.6	10.6 5.9	4.3 4.4	0 1.5	8.5 1.5	2.1 4.4	12.8 10.3	0 4.4	0 0	47 68
1948 - 1965 Con. Lib.	60.5 65.0	15.8 12.5	7.9 5.0	0 2.5	7.9 0	2.6 12.5	5.3 2.5	0 0	0 0	38 40
TOTALS Con. Lib.	62.3 67.4	14.7 11.1	5.1 3.1	0.6 2.5	5.7 1.2	2.9 4.9	6.8 6.2	0.6 1.9	0.6 1.2	177 161

\* All ministers who served in MacDonald's first Cabinet have been coded as "Conservative" in spite of the fact that several of them were known as Reformers or Liberals. In essence they were serving in a Conservative ministry and in a period when party lines were anything but strong. The same does not apply to the 1917 Union Cabinet for several of its members later returned to the folds of Liberalism.



Table 3 - 10 indicates that there is very little difference between parties in respect of occupational distribution of Cabinet posts. The Conservatives have appointed slightly larger numbers of lawyers to Cabinet positions but slightly fewer merchants. None of the differences in this table are, in fact, significant and the assertion that occupationally as well as educationally our two major parties are the same at the top is a safe one.

Again it should be pointed out that it has not been possible to determine what sorts of secondary interests the ministers may have represented especially through their legal practices for this data is well hidden from the public eye. What this material does suggest is that the routes to the upper levels of the political elite are, in both societies but especially in French Canada, very strongly constrained by occupation and by the boundaries of upper middle class status. There is evidence that this is becoming less true for French Canada and we might expect the process to continue, but any suggestion that the upper levels of our political elite in either society is drawn from a broad class reservoir must be rejected.



## MISCELIANEOUS SOCIAL FACTORS

Before concluding this chapter three minor social determinants may be mentioned. They are respectively marital status, family connections in politics and rural and urban birthplace and are found in Tables Appendix - 13, 14 and 15.

The table showing marital status is something less than surprising except perhaps in the closeness of the two ethnic groups. 4.5% of English ministers have been single and 4.2% of French. Yet it would hardly be safe to assert with the example of King or Bennet in mind that a wife is vital to success in climbing to the top in Canadian politics. A single Cabinet minister is indeed a rarity and having a wife to help with social functions is undoubtedly useful but it would be unsafe even in the face of statistical evidence to assert that a Cabinet Minister must be married. Rather he is likely to be simply because almost all men of his age are.

With respect to family connections in politics we see in Table Appendix - 14 that there has been none too great a tendency in Canada to establish "political" families. Still the statistics are interesting for at





times political connections do seem to have helped in getting to a Cabinet post. Thus from 1867 to 1896, 45% of French ministers were related to other politicians.<sup>4</sup> The proportion appeared to be decreasing steadily but 29.2% of post-war French politicians have had relatives in politics -- again a significant number. Among the English the proportion has never been as high and has decreased steadily from an initial peak of 29.7% to a post-war low of 13.2%. Since not that many families in Canada are involved in politics these proportions are still fairly high, but not large enough to suggest that having relatives in politics is of any more than marginal value to English-Canadian politicians striving to reach the top. To French-Canadians it would appear to be more useful yet but still rather less than vital.

Table Appendix - 15 indicates the proportions of English and French ministers by period who have had rural or urban places of birth. In general the percentages of urban births are slightly higher among the English but in two periods, 1867 to 1896 and 1921 to 1948 a higher proportion of French than English ministers were urban-born

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4. "Related" refers to only one rank of relatives i.e. first cousins or closer either by marriage or birth.



and the overall difference is just 1.1%. Before 1896, 14.1% of all ministers were urban-born whereas since 1948, 30.4% of all have been born in urban areas. The major point of this table is simply to illustrate that there are in fact very few differences between the charter groups in this respect. As an interesting sidelight some 30.2% of English ministers between 1867 and 1896 were born outside Canada and since Confederation thirty-six or 14.7% of our English ministers have been foreign born. Most of these, as was indicated in Chapter II have been concentrated in Western Canada and Ontario.

### CONCLUSIONS

Several points need to be made in conclusion. The first is that socially the Cabinet is but poorly representative of Canada as a whole and that in fact it is not even particularly representative of the House of Commons from which it is drawn. Its educational level for both cultures is higher than that of ordinary Members of Parliament and far higher than the general population and it is recruited primarily from the narrow boundaries of the upper middle class. Occupationally, even within this class it far over-represents the professions and





especially the legal profession. It contains proportionately far more professionals and lawyers than even the House of Commons. Religiously it seems to represent roughly the Canadian population and the House of Commons but there is little evidence one way or another that this is any more than an accidental by-product of other determining factors for it does not, in fact, represent the general population in this regard nearly so well as does the House of Commons.

The second is that there is evidence that the French Cabinet Minister is even more a member of an elite than his English counterpart for his educational level is higher than his English colleagues even though his society has had lower educational levels and he is even more specifically recruited from the very small professional class. The "typical" French-Canadian Cabinet Minister will be a lawyer who has attended collège classique (before 1921 very likely one of St. Hyacinthe, Quebec or Levis) and gone on to Laval where he did undergraduate work and studied law. He may well have had some relatives in politics.

On the other hand the "typical" English-speaking minister is probably a lawyer (but is far less certain to be so than his French counterpart) and has likely but not certainly attended university. His chances of entry to the



Cabinet would seem to be enhanced by a private school education and by overseas post-graduate study if he is not a lawyer and he may, about 20% of the time, have had some other relative in politics. But none of these things can be said to be absolutely vital to his gaining a portfolio in the way that a collège classique education is for the French minister and the English routes of entry to the Cabinet seem to be wider than the French.

Thirdly, however, it must be pointed out that the ministers from either ethnic orientation are becoming more alike and that the change is occurring mainly in the French-Canadian ministers. Laval is no longer the only university -- Montreal is apparently its equal. No particular collège classique today dominates among ministers and most important of all, the French Canadian need no longer be a lawyer or professional -- increasingly he may be a businessman or a public servant.

This latter point is perhaps the most vital of all, for as the highest representatives of the two races become more alike it follows that they will possibly find it easier to talk to each other and if the Cabinet is to become a true arbiter of ethnic interests in Canada and a hyphen between the two races this is vital. The old





French-Canadian minister would appear to have come from a narrow mold indeed and this could not help but influence him in his contacts with the rest of Canada. The broader mold and the increasing similarity of the highest levels of the political elite in Canada need not mean anything like cultural assimilation but it is likely to make bargaining easier and it is certain to make the new breed of Cabinet Minister a better spokesman for Quebec.<sup>5</sup>

Finally a point made in the introduction should be briefly reiterated here. The fact that the Cabinet is not strictly a socially representative institution need not mitigate against its effectiveness as a mechanism of accommodation for Canada. The degree to which a politician is in touch with opinion back home probably depends more on his political skill and experience than on his social representativeness and his touch with opinion at home as well as his ability to lead it is what determines his effectiveness as an arbiter. The political career of the politician is therefore vital and it is to a discussion of this that we now turn.

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5. In this connection it is notable that the three most prominent recent converts to Liberal canadidacies on the Federal scene, Messrs. Marchand, Trudeau and Pelletier are respectively a labour leader, an activist academic and a journalist. Two of them would be categorized as "professionals" but none of them fits the old juridically inclined and essentially conservative tradition.





## CHAPTER IV

### THE POLITICAL CAREERS OF CABINET MINISTERS

In this chapter the discussion turns to an examination of the political career patterns of the members of the federal cabinet in an attempt to illustrate further similarities and differences between French and English-Canadian Cabinet ministers over time and to indicate the extent of the commitment, in terms of political experience at least, of each to federal politics. It is set up in three sections to describe the pre-cabinet careers of the ministers, the age distribution and length of service in the cabinet of ministers and, finally, their post-cabinet careers.

#### The Pre-Cabinet Career Patterns

##### (i) Parliamentary

Table 4-1 indicates the length of service in Parliament before appointment to the Cabinet by party and period and also indicates the numbers of ministers drawn into the Cabinet from outside the House of Commons. We see that overall 10.3% of French ministers have been called to the Cabinet from outside of the House of Commons whereas 19.2% of English ministers were "outsiders". No French minister since the war has been of this type (although some undoubtedly



Table 4-1

PARLIAMENTARY SERVICE BEFORE APPOINTMENT  
TO CABINET BY PERIOD AND ETHNIC ORIENTATION  
(FIGURES IN PERCENTAGES)

\* \*\*

Length of Service Ethnic Orientation	Appointed to Cabinet from out- side Par- liament	Never sat in House	0-3 months	3-12 months	1-2 years	2-4 years	4-8 years	8-12 years	Over 12 years	Total in row
1867-1896 English French	1.6 0	9.4 5.0	3.1 5.0	0 0	3.1 5.0	3.1 15.0	20.3 15.0	21.9 30.0	37.5 25.0	63 20
1896-1921 English French	32.6 7.1	6.4 0	2.2 14.3	2.2 0	0 7.1	10.9 14.3	8.7 21.4	13.0 7.1	23.9 28.6	45 14
1921-1948 English French	11.6 6.9	7.0 17.2	8.1 17.2	4.7 3.4	5.8 0	15.1 6.9	15.1 13.8	17.4 10.3	15.1 24.1	86 29
1948-1965 English French	9.4 0	3.8 0	9.4 12.5	5.7 4.2	1.9 8.3	15.1 12.5	15.1 33.3	18.9 25.0	20.8 4.2	51 25
Totals English French All	12.4 3.4 9.8	6.8 6.9 6.8	6.0 12.6 7.3	3.2 2.3 3.0	3.2 4.6 3.6	11.2 11.5 11.3	15.3 20.7 16.7	18.1 18.4 18.3	23.7 19.5 22.6	245 88 333

\* Includes only those who were subsequently elected.

\*\* Includes outside appointees who were defeated and senators sitting in the Cabinet.





have been persuaded to stand for election on the understanding that if they were successful they would be given a Cabinet portfolio). The number of English "outsiders" has dropped steadily from a high of 39.1% during the Borden and Laurier ministries to 13.2% in the post-war period, but in spite of the decline this still appears to be a significant route of entry to the cabinet for English, if not for French ministers.

The use of the Senate as a source of Cabinet members is illustrated in Table Appendix - 17. With the exception of J.C. Chapais in 1867, no Cabinet minister while retaining his portfolio was ever placed in the Senate directly upon losing an election, but over all 10.4% of English and 8.0% of French Cabinet ministers have been senators. The use of senators as ministers has declined drastically from early post-Confederation days when 30% of French and 28.1% of English ministers sat in the Senate to the post-war period when no French and only 5.7% of English have come from the Senate. In fact since 1896 it has become regular usage to appoint the Government House Leader in the Senate a minister without portfolio but to give the Senate no other portfolios.<sup>1</sup>

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1. The appointment of Wallace McCutcheon to Trade and Commerce in the Diefenbaker Cabinet cannot be regarded as precedent setting. Mr. McCutcheon was an outsider appointed to the Senate and the Privy Council simultaneously. Moreover this step, somewhat controversial at the time has not been taken again.



Since Confederation seven Cabinet ministers have been appointed to the Senate after they were made ministers and all of these entered the Senate from outside of Parliament. Since 1896, however, this has become an insignificant possibility. Nineteen of the twenty-six English Cabinet ministers who have been senators were senators of long standing (over one year) as were three of the seven French ministers from the Senate. In summary, the use of the Senate for Cabinet ministers has declined drastically since 1896 and is now of only minor significance for English ministers and of negligible importance for French.

Table 4-1 also indicates the number of years experience in Parliament before Cabinet appointment and illustrates that there is little to choose between the charter ethnic groups in this respect. The fact that the final category, "over twelve years" contains a significant proportion of the entries makes the accurate calculation of means or medians impossible but a quick look at the distribution suggests that for both races the median value is about twelve years. The major point here is simply that ministers of either group who have been drawn from the Commons are likely to have had about twelve years experience in the House. A significant exception to this is found in the fact that 19.2% of English and 26.4% of French ministers had under two years of Commons service before appointment. This





suggests that there are in fact two political groups in most Cabinets, those who are very fresh to the House of Commons and those who are real veterans in the federal House. The French ministers would seem to tend towards the more inexperienced, the English towards the most experienced.

Table Appendix - 16 showing federal political experience by party indicates that the Conservatives have taken fewer (14.2%) of their ministers from outside the House than have the Liberals (20.0%) but that they have had nearly equal proportions of senators in their Cabinets. The distribution of length of experience in the House of Commons appears to be nearly equal between parties.

Table 4-2 indicates the distribution of political experience in the House of Commons for all Commons members since Confederation. This data, from an outside source, is not strictly comparable with ours since the time periods are different but it does indicate that the mean years of political experience of Members of Parliament is probably lower than that of Cabinet ministers. The data is also not strictly comparable because the political experience distribution curve of Cabinet ministers is "M" shaped having peaks in the 0-2 year and over 12 year positions. It would appear that those Cabinet ministers who are not





Table 4-2

1

HOUSE OF COMMONS EXPERIENCE FOR ALL HOUSE MEMBERS  
(FIGURES IN PERCENTAGES)

Period Years Experience	1867 1873	1874 1877	1878 1895	1896 1899	1900 1910	1911 1929	1930 1939	1940 1953
0 - 2	15.0	14.4	6.3	6.2	7.2	6.3	4.7	4.2
3 - 4	7.3	36.7	21.1	30.1	31.8	29.3	3.8	29.0
5	21.3	3.3	18.2	4.4	2.3	4.4	35.6	9.4
6 - 10	25.2	22.2	24.7	31.9	24.3	33.3	18.2	30.5
11 - 15	14.0	11.1	16.1	15.9	18.0	14.3	15.7	17.5
16 - 20	8.0	3.3	7.4	1.8	10.6	6.9	12.3	7.6
21 - 30	7.6	6.7	5.5	8.8	4.6	4.2	9.7	1.8
31 - 45	1.6	2.2	0.8	0.9	1.6	1.4	-	-
Mean	9.2	9.2	7.7	8.9	8.8	9.3	8.1	10.2

1 Data supplied by R.R. March.



parliamentary "rookies" are in fact more experienced than the average Member of Parliament but aside from that it is difficult to make any generalization.

(ii) Outside of Federal Parliament

Table Appendix - 18 indicates the type of municipal experience of Cabinet ministers before their entry to federal politics. The data here are perhaps somewhat spotty since the ministers did not always indicate when they had such experience but aside from a smattering of former aldermen and controllers only the "Mayor or Reeve" column is meaningful. From it we see that 13.7% of English cabinet ministers had such experience and that 18.4% of French Cabinet ministers had been Mayors or Reeves. Since the war there has been a decrease in the number of ministers with municipal experience and the overall figures indicate that this can hardly be considered a prerequisite to Cabinet membership but that French ministers have tended slightly more than English to have had such experience.

Table 4-3 shows the provincial political experience of Cabinet ministers by period and ethnic orientation. Experience in provincial Upper Houses (rare things that they are) is negligible once we get past the first few Parliaments after Confederation and can be safely ignored here. It is also important to note that the 1867-95 period is far higher





Table 4-3

PROVINCIAL POLITICAL EXPERIENCE OF CABINET MINISTERS  
BEFORE APPOINTMENT BY ETHNIC ORIENTATION AND PERIOD  
(FIGURES IN PERCENTAGES\*)

Provincial Experience Ethnic Orientation	Upper House		Provincial Cabinet**		Provincial Premier		Provincial Legislature		Total N. in row
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	
1867-1896 English French	14.1 15.0	85.9 85.0	51.6 35.0	48.4 65.0	21.9 10.0	78.1 90.0	73.0 60.0	27.0 40.0	63 20
1896-1921 English French	2.2 7.1	97.8 92.9	30.4 14.3	69.6 85.7	19.6 7.1	80.4 92.9	39.1 50.0	60.9 50.0	45 14
1921-1948 English French	0.0 0.0	100.0 100.0	14.0 10.3	86.0 89.7	8.1 3.4	91.9 96.6	29.1 20.7	70.9 79.3	86 29
1948-1965 English French	0.0 0.0	100.0 100.0	7.5 0.0	92.5 100.0	3.8 0.0	96.2 100.0	18.9 8.3	81.1 91.7	51 25
Totals English French All	4.0 4.6 4.2	96.0 95.4 95.8	25.3 13.8 22.4	74.7 86.2 77.6	12.9 4.6 10.8	87.1 95.4 89.2	40.0 30.2 37.6	60.0 69.8 62.4	245 88 333

\* Figures in each pair of cells sum to 100.

\*\* Includes Premiers.



than those which follow it in all facets of provincial experience simply because all political experience before 1867 was for our purposes considered to be provincial experience. Thus in the first period over 50% of English and 35% of French ministers had been in provincial Cabinets, but the figures dropped quickly to 30.4% and 14.3% respectively in the next period and have been declining ever since. Considerably more English than French ministers have had such experience but in both cases the proportions have dropped to insignificant amounts since the last war. In summary, then, the number of Cabinet ministers with provincial legislative experience has declined steadily since 1867 when almost everyone had come from provincial legislatures until the post-war period when only 18.4% of English and 8.5% of French ministers had such experience.

Similarly 21.9% of English Cabinet ministers between 1867 and 1896 and 10.0% of French had been provincial premiers and the proclivity of ex-provincial premiers for English Cabinet portfolios continued into this century. Since 1921, however, this has become a far less common training ground for Cabinet ministers and has become negligible since 1948.

The major point which arises out of this table is a rather surprising one; in terms of numerical representation,





at least, English-Canadian Cabinet ministers have a greater commitment to provincial politics than have French ministers. In every category of provincial experience in Table 4-3 there are proportionately more English than French ministers indicating that provincial legislatures have been more a training ground for English ministers than for French. This may indicate a surprising lack of commitment to Quebec and Quebec politics on the part of the French members of our highest political elite. Why this should be so is hard to say -- two reasons immediately suggest themselves. The first is that French politicians who are deeply committed to Quebec politics tend to stay at home and be satisfied with being maîtres chez eux rather than going to Ottawa to bargain with the English. The other is that such politicians, if they are present in the House of Commons, may be passed over by Prime Ministers in an attempt to represent only French Canadians of national rather than provincial outlook in the Cabinet. Significantly, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, who was far more capable of handling his French Cabinet colleagues and indeed Quebec than most of our Prime Ministers have been, chose half of his French ministers from among those with provincial legislative experience.

Since the second War the experience of a Member of





Parliament in provincial politics seems to have dwindled into insignificance as a determinant of his selection to the Cabinet; perhaps a further indication of an increasing commitment to national politics or perhaps, an indication that politicians would rather stay at home in the provinces once they get established there.

Table Appendix - 19 goes over the same ground as Table 4-3 except that it differentiates Cabinet ministers by party rather than by ethnic orientation. It need not be discussed in detail here for it is not germane to the discussion of the politics of biculturalism but it is interesting to note once again that there are only very slight differences between the parties with regard to political experiences of their political leaders, another indication of the similarity between major Canadian parties.

Table Appendix - 20 illustrates by period and ethnic orientation the public service experience of Cabinet ministers before their ministerial appointments. Only 5.4% of English ministers and 3.4% of French ministers have had such experience and it has been mainly in the upper civil service or diplomatic corps. The table is appended only to demonstrate that this is not a significant route of Cabinet entry.

Table Appendix - 21 shows experience in non-Cabinet



parliamentary office before appointment by period and ethnic orientation. In this field French-Canadian ministers have been more experienced than English with 27.6% of them having had some such experience compared to 16.1% of the English. The largest category here is that of parliamentary Assistants and this path has become, since the war, an increasingly important route to Cabinet entry with nearly one-quarter of ministers appointed since the war having had experience in this area. None of the other categories is large enough to bear closer scrutiny here; non-Cabinet ministries, speakerships and deputy speakerships have all provided ministers but again we can hardly assert that holding such an office is any more than a slight help to elevation to ministerial rank in the Cabinet. Of 27 speakers since Confederation, for instance, only 3 have become Cabinet ministers after stepping down permanently from the Chair.

Table 4-4 demonstrates the percentages of new Members of Parliament having various types of political experience. Attention should be concentrated on the unweighted mean columns at the right of the table for they are most directly comparable to our data. From them we see that a lower proportion of Cabinet ministers than Members of Parliament has had municipal political experience. Experience in





Table 4-4

PRE-PARLIAMENTARY POLITICAL EXPERIENCE OF NEW M.P.'S  
BY PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION<sup>1</sup> (FIGURES IN PERCENTAGES)\*

Year of Entry to Parliament Experience	1867	1872	1874	1878	1882	1887	1891	1896	1900	1904	1908	1911	1917	1921	1925	1926	1930	1935	1940	1945	Mean 1867 1895	Mean 1895 1921	Mean 1921 1945
Municipal Politics	17	33	39	38	44	46	37	42	45	47	39	30	31	30	32	32	37	29	24	32	36	39	31
Provincial MLA's	58	24	25	23	25	20	22	26	21	19	23	29	15	14	23	12	15	17	15	9	28	22	15
Provincial Cabinet	15	12	7	5	8	2	8	5	6	2	4	6	3	7	6	4	5	5	5	4	18	4	5
No Experience	25	43	36	39	31	34	41	32	34	44	38	41	54	56	45	56	48	54	61	59	36	40	54

<sup>1</sup> Data from Norman Ward, The Canadian House of Commons, p. 122.

\* Members may have more than one type of experience so that percentages do not add vertically to 100.0.



municipal politics is therefore of no help in getting into the Cabinet once a politician has gotten into Parliament. However a higher proportion of Cabinet ministers than Members of Parliament has had experience in provincial legislatures and whereas 22.4% of federal Cabinet ministers have sat in provincial Cabinets, only about 5.3% of Members of Parliament have done so. Since the Cabinet usually includes about 10% of the House of Commons or very roughly about 15-20% of the party in power this means that any ex-provincial Cabinet minister in the majority party is virtually assured of a Cabinet post and indeed many were brought in from outside to fill such posts.

Thus a Member of Parliament's chances of Cabinet appointment would appear to be highest if he has been a provincial Cabinet minister but they are also enhanced if he has been an M.L.A. Municipal political experience appears to have no significance. It should be emphasized, however, that these figures cover only the period up to 1945 and that data on Members of Parliament since then is unavailable.

#### The Ages and Length of Time in Cabinet of Cabinet Ministers

Tables 4-5 and 4-6 indicate the mean years of service in the Cabinet for the usual four periods since Confederation divided respectively according to ethnic orientation and



Table 4-5

AGES AT CABINET ENTRY AND RETIREMENT BY  
PERIOD AND ETHNIC ORIENTATION  
(ALL VALUES ARE MEANS IN YEARS)

Period and Ethnic Orientation	Age at Cabinet Appointment	Age at Leaving Cabinet	Average Years in Cabinet
1867-1895			
English	50.8	56.9	6.1
French	46.5	53.0	6.5
1895-1921			
English	51.3	59.7	8.4
French	49.5	53.4	3.9
1921-1948			
English	52.2	57.3	5.1
French	51.0	57.5	6.5
1948-1965 **			
English	52.1	57.8	5.7
French	45.4	46.7	1.3 *
Totals			
English	51.7	57.7	6.0
French	48.1	53.5	5.4
All	50.7	56.7	6.0

\* Since 1867 French ministers have produced 22.6% of the total man-years in the cabinet while taking 26.1% of the total number of appointments.

\*\* Retired ministers only.





Table 4-6

AGES AT CABINET ENTRY AND RETIREMENT BY  
PARTY AND PERIOD  
(ALL VALUES ARE MEANS IN YEARS)

Party and Period	Age at Cabinet Appointment	Age at Leaving Cabinet	Average Years in Cabinet
1867-1895 Conservative Liberal	50.4 48.1	56.0 50.7	5.6 2.6
1895-1921 Conservative Liberal	50.8 51.0	56.7 59.8	5.9 8.7
1921-1948 Conservative Liberal	53.4 50.8	56.3 58.2	2.9 7.8
1948-1965 Conservative Liberal*	52.3 47.8	55.5 52.3	3.2 4.5
Totals Conservative Liberal All	51.7 49.7 50.7	56.1 57.6 56.7	4.4 7.9 6.0

\*Retired ministers only.



party. Turning first to Table 4-5 we see that overall English Cabinet ministers have tended to be slightly older (3.6 years at entry and 4.2 years at leaving) than the French and that they serve for a longer (0.6 years) period. In every period since Confederation the English have been older and in the periods 1921-1948 and 1867-1896 the French have tended to have longer service. However, the length of service is only slightly longer than that of the English. In the other periods, 1895-1921 and 1948-1965 the French have had far shorter terms in the ministry than have the English. Until 1945, French Cabinet ministers were tending to become a little older but since the war the mean age at entry of French appointees has dropped to 45.4 years. This data is fairly simple and the tabulation need not be described in much greater detail here. However it is interesting to compare it to Table 4-6 where we see that, on the whole, Conservative Cabinet ministers have been 2.0 years older at entry than have the Liberals but that the mean duration of Liberals in the Cabinet has been 2.2 years longer than that of the Conservatives. The mean duration in the Cabinet by party has been quite variable with time due to the variation in the length of ministries but in the post-war period, Liberal Cabinets have tended to be considerably younger than was that of the Diefenbaker government and Cabinet ministers have proven more durable.





The data above may be compared with the mean ages of normal Members of Parliament as follows:<sup>1</sup>

<u>Period</u>	<u>Mean Age M.P.s</u>
1867 - 1895	46.1
1896 - 1920	50.0
1921 - 1945	51.4

The point here is simply that as the House of Commons has grown older, so have Cabinet ministers. Unfortunately there is no data available on post-war Parliaments nor is the original Member of Parliament data divided according to ethnic orientation so that comparison cannot be taken further here.

But rather than dwell on these numbers themselves it might be useful to remark on their significance. The previous two sections have told us that English-Canadian ministers are older, more politically experienced and more durable in the Cabinet than are their French-speaking colleagues. This would imply that they may have a voice in the Cabinet somewhat out of proportion to their numbers and that this too may be a factor leading to a certain hidden underrepresentation of French Canadians at the top of our political elite. To be truly effective spokesmen for French Canada,

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1. Adapted from N. Ward The Canadian House of Commons, p. 129.



as they presumably should be if the Cabinet is to be an effective means of accommodation in Canada, it would seem reasonable that the French and English-speaking ministers should be political equals and yet as we have seen, in many ways they are not. The conclusion must be, then, that here is a place where the Cabinet is something less than a perfect accommodator of various interests in Canada.

#### Post-Cabinet Political Careers

Table 4-7 indicates the types of post-cabinet career patterns followed by Cabinet ministers divided by period and ethnic orientation. Table 4-8 contains similar information divided according to party and period and Table 4-9 indicates, for the period from 1867 to 1935 similar information by period for Members of Parliament as a whole. Each will be discussed here in turn.

Turning first to Table 4-7, by far the largest proportion of ex-cabinet ministers who do not either retire altogether or die remain in some way connected with federal politics. Since Confederation this has been true for 55.0% of English Cabinet ministers and 46.9% of French. The largest proportion of these have remained in the House of Commons but nearly as many English and only slightly fewer French have received Senate appointments. These figures





Table 4-7

## POST-CABINET CAREERS OF CABINET MINISTERS BY PERIOD AND

## ETHNIC ORIENTATION (FIGURES IN PERCENTAGES)\*

\* If more than one position was occupied all positions will appear; percentages do not add horizontally to 100%.

horizontally to 100%.																		
Type of Career	Period & Ethnic Orientation	Provincial Politics			Federal Politics			Judiciary			Public Service			Private Life			Total N. in row	
		Provincial Cabinet	Premier	Other	Senate	M. P.	Lieutenant Governor	Other	Supreme Court Canada	Provincial Superior Court	Other	Diplomatic Service	Board or Upper C.S.	Commissioner	Business or Industry	Professional Practice		Other
1867-1896 English French		1.6	0.0	3.2	25.0	26.6	20.5	0.0	1.6	9.5	3.2	1.6	0.0	3.2	8.0	1.6	6.3	63
		0	5.0	0.0	20.0	20.0	30.0	0.0	5.0	20.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	10.0	5.0	0.0	20
1896-1921 English French		0.0	0.0	0.0	23.9	17.4	4.3	0.0	4.3	4.3	0.0	2.2	2.2	17.3	15.2	0.0	4.3	45
		0.0	0.0	0.0	14.3	17.1	21.4	0.0	7.1	21.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	14.3	0.0	7.1	0.0	14
1921-1948 English French		0.0	3.5	0.0	25.9	15.3	3.5	3.5	2.4	6.7	0.0	3.5	2.4	7.1	8.2	17.6	9.4	86
		0.0	0.0	0.0	17.2	10.3	3.4	0.0	0.0	20.7	3.4	3.4	0.0	10.3	0.0	28.6	10.3	29
1948-1965 English French		2.6	0.0	0.0	10.5	39.5	2.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.6	10.5	21.0	10.4	51
		0.0	6.3	0.0	25.0	18.8	6.3	0.0	0.0	6.3	0.0	6.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	18.8	6.3	25
Totals English French All		0.9	1.3	0.9	22.7	22.7	8.2	1.4	2.2	5.2	4.4	2.2	1.3	7.3	10.0	10.3	7.8	245
		0.0	2.5	0.0	19.1	13.9	13.9	0.0	2.5	17.7	1.3	2.5	0.0	6.4	2.6	16.7	5.1	88
		0.6	1.6	0.6	20.2	19.0	9.7	0.9	2.2	8.3	1.5	2.2	0.7	7.0	8.0	11.9	7.1	333





have not varied greatly with time with the exception of a rather low proportion of English Senate appointees from 1921 to 1947. A surprisingly large number have been appointed to the position of Lieutenant Governor. From 1867 to 1895 fully 20.3% of English and 30% of French Cabinet ministers received such appointments. The numbers dropped considerably from then until 1948 but since 1948 this type of appointment has apparently made a comeback among favourite patronage posts. Proportionally more French Canadians have received such appointments than English Canadians.

The second most favoured retiring ground of Cabinet ministers is back to private life. 28.1% of English Cabinet ministers and 24.4% of French have made such a return. Among the English the balance is almost equal between business or industry and professional practice while in keeping with their professional predilections the French Canadian ministers usually have gone back into professional practice. Due primarily to the small numbers involved the fluctuations over time here are extreme but in general it is safe to assert the French-Canadian ministers are less likely to go back to business positions and more likely to professional than the English. This would seem to indicate that even while in the Cabinet French Canadians have not tended to build up business connections aside from their own professional practices.



A career in the judiciary is another popular stamping ground for old Cabinet ministers. Seven of them, five English and two French have made it to the Supreme Court of Canada and another 8.3% have been appointed to provincial superior courts. This would appear a more popular retirement spot for French than English ministers for 17.7% of French ministers have received such appointments as opposed to only 5.2% of the English. Since the end of World War II this type of posting seems to be declining in favour and only one of the post-war appointees (and he French) has gone on to a provincial Supreme Court appointment. Note that prior to 1948 over 20% of French ex-ministers had received Provincial Superior Court judgeships.

The public service has taken 10.8% of English Cabinet retirees since 1867 and 8.9% of French. A few have gone into the diplomatic service and a few into the upper civil service but the numbers here are too small to permit of any analysis. However 7.0% have at some time or other served on Boards or Commissions of Inquiry. These are normally very temporary appointments but the number does serve to indicate that old Cabinet ministers do form a reserve pool of commissioners and board members upon which the government occasionally may call. There is not much to choose between English and French in this respect.





Table 4-8

## POST-CABINET CAREERS OF CABINET MINISTERS BY PARTY AND PERIOD

Position Party and Period	Federal Politics			Provincial Politics				Judicial Posts			Public Service			Private Career			Total N. in Row
	Senate	M.P.	Other	Lieutenant Governor	Cabinet Minister	Premier	Other	Supreme Court	Provincial Court	Other	Diplomatic	Civil Ser- vice and Boards	Commis- sions	Industry or Business	Private Practice	Other	
1867-1896 Cons. Libs.	19.4 13.0	17.7 43.5	4.8 8.6	22.0 26.1	1.7 0.0	1.7 0.0	5.1 0.0	0.0 8.7	14.8 8.7	3.3 0.0	1.6 0.0	0.0 0.0	0.0 4.5	3.3 0.0	4.9 4.3	11.4 0.0	62 23
1896-1921 Cons. Libs.	23.3 13.3	13.3 16.7	0.0 6.7	3.3 13.3	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	0.0 10.3	16.7 0.0	3.3 0.0	0.0 3.6	3.3 0.0	13.3 13.3	0.0 0.0	6.7 0.0	19.9 3.3	30 30
1921-1948 Cons. Libs.	21.3 14.9	17.0 11.9	6.4 7.5	4.3 3.0	0.0 0.0	4.3 1.5	0.0 3.0	0.0 3.0	4.3 11.9	0.0 1.5	0.0 6.2	2.2 1.5	6.5 4.6	30.4 13.4	13.0 7.5	8.7 4.5	47 68
1948-1965 Cons. Libs.	10.4 25.0	47.4 0.0	0.0 0.0	5.3 0.0	0.0 6.3	0.0 6.3	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	0.0 6.3	0.0 0.0	0.0 6.7	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	18.4 18.9	10.5 6.3	5.2 12.6	38 40
Total Cons. Libs. All	18.6 15.3 17.3	23.1 16.8 20.4	3.4 6.6 4.7	10.6 8.8 9.7	0.6 0.7 0.6	1.8 1.4 1.6	1.8 1.4 1.6	0.0 5.1 2.3	9.0 8.0 8.7	2.4 0.0 1.2	0.6 4.4 2.3	1.2 0.7 1.0	3.9 5.8 4.9	13.0 8.8 11.3	8.5 5.1 7.1	10.1 4.2 8.0	177 161 338



Finally we should mention that a very negligible proportion of old Cabinet ministers went back to provincial politics. Only nine in all have made such a move and in spite of the present-day example of Mr. Lesage this cannot be considered a significant retirement place for old Cabinet members.

Table 4-8 covers the same ground except that differentiation between ministers is made by party rather than by ethnic orientation. It illustrates again that in most respects there is very little difference between parties. Somewhat larger numbers of Conservative ex-Cabinet ministers have remained in federal politics than have Liberals, but almost equal numbers have been appointed to Lieutenant Governorships. Almost equally negligible proportions from both parties have returned to provincial politics and for the most part the distribution of judicial posts has been similar. One rather interesting exception appears here, however, as all seven of the ex-Cabinet ministers appointed to the Supreme Court of Canada have been Liberals. Slightly more Liberals than Conservatives have tended to go into the public service and proportionately more of them have gone into the diplomatic corps. More Conservatives have returned to private life and substantially more Conservatives have returned to private industry or business.





Table 4-9

POST-PARLIAMENTARY CAREERS OF MEMBERS OF  
PARLIAMENT BY PERIOD\* (FIGURES IN PERCENTAGES)\*\*

Career Period	Judicial	Senate	Lt. Governor	Public Service	Provincial Politics	Died in Office	Retired
1867-1896	8.9	8.9	4.4	10.2	7.2	9.3	51.6
1896-1911	10.4	9.6	3.5	9.4	5.4	10.8	51.8
1911-1935	5.9	11.9	1.0	5.1	6.2	10.3	59.6

\* Includes ex-Cabinet ministers. Data from Norman Ward, The Canadian House of Commons, p. 145.

\*\* Total numbers in row not available.





However in general what differences there are here appear to be random fluctuations due to the small numbers involved rather than anything very significant.

Table 4-9 indicates the post House of Commons careers for all Members of Parliament from 1867 to 1935. More recent data is not at present available. To some extent comparisons between these figures and those of Cabinet ministers are deceptive for these figures include those for Cabinet ministers as well and since Cabinet ministers are generally more prominent both nationally and in the councils of their party they will be over-represented in Table 4-9 as well. Still at least rough comparisons can be made. The House of Commons in general appears to be proportionally as well represented as the Cabinet on the bench. In any period about 7 to 10% of ex-Members of Parliament seem to gain judicial appointments compared to about 11% of ex-Cabinet ministers. However only about half as many (proportionately) Members of Parliament are represented in the Senate and less than half as many are appointed to be Lieutenant Governors. However proportionately more Members of Parliament go into some form of public service and three or four times as many can be expected to go to provincial politics. Since these latter two places might be considered to be in lower favour as post-federal careers it is a safe inference that when



the upper level of the political elite steps down from office it steps down to a higher position than do retired Members of Parliament.

This concludes our discussion of the post-Cabinet careers of Cabinet ministers and indeed of their political careers. We have seen that between the two major ethnic orientations there are differences in pre-Cabinet experience and in duration in Cabinet office which might make the French contingent in the Cabinet somewhat less strong than its numbers would suggest. French Cabinet ministers would seem to be more alienated than their English-speaking counterparts from provincial politics and this would presumably tend to make them a rather less strong set of spokesmen for the province of Quebec than they might otherwise be. They have also tended to have slightly less federal experience, they are younger and as we have seen they generally hold office for a shorter period than do English ministers. This also would tend to mitigate against their weight in the Cabinet and would seem to lessen its effectiveness as a mechanism for accommodating various interests in Canada. We shall be returning to this question in the concluding chapter, but before any conclusions are drawn it will be wise to examine the personnel of certain Cabinets from a more historical point of view and in that direction we now turn.





## CHAPTER V

## A SURVEY OF THE FORMATION OF SEVERAL CABINETS

This Chapter marks a departure from the type of discussion provided in the three preceding Chapters in that instead of treating Cabinet Ministers as statistics it will take certain Cabinets and describe their formation and the actual reasons why certain of their key personnel were chosen. This sort of description is, I think, useful in a study of this type in order to provide a degree of perspective which can occasionally be lost beneath a pile of statistics, for the Cabinet is after all a group of humans working together and is therefore susceptible to all sorts of prejudices and extraneous events. A Prime Minister, as we shall see, rarely selects his Cabinet for purely sectional and representative purposes; instead he is subject to all sorts of political and personal pressures and temptations. We certainly cannot begin to describe these here for all Cabinet since Confederation but it is possible to at least illustrate the type of considerations involved in Cabinet formation which do not appear in the statistics. A far more extensive study along these lines has been presented to the Commission by Dr. F. Gibson.

The type of material presented here is strongly dependent upon the availability of various political figures' papers, reminiscences and biographies. Since this Chapter is not part of the statistical work which this project



was specifically defined to cover, reliance has been placed mainly on secondary sources and therefore the Cabinets to be discussed will be limited basically to those for which some such material is available. Unfortunately this, for the most part, precludes post-war Cabinets since all of our post-war Prime Ministers (with the exception of King who essentially belongs to the pre-war era in Canadian politics) are still alive and have not released their papers nor had definitive political biographies produced for them. Nonetheless, we may expect with a considerable degree of confidence, that the same sort of considerations apply in the formation of post-war Cabinets as apply to earlier ones and that for the most part the differences are of degree rather than kind.

The Cabinets to be discussed here, then, are the 1867 Cabinet of John A. Macdonald which will be briefly covered, the 1873-78 Cabinet of Alexander Mackenzie which will be discussed in some detail, Borden's Cabinets of 1911 and 1917 and Meighen's of 1921 which will be given only short coverage and finally King's Cabinets between 1921 and 1930 which will again be covered in some detail.

It would undoubtedly be especially worthwhile to have a description of the formation of the present Cabinet



(the more so as it appears to have been a significant departure from tradition in its increased representation of the French Canadians and of the intellectual as opposed to the political element of Canadian political life) but no material is available on its formation. Unfortunately there is also very little information available in secondary sources on Sir Wilfrid Laurier's Cabinets and even less on those of Mr. St. Laurent so right away a bias is introduced in that our two French Prime Ministers are left uncovered. But with these points in mind we can start at the beginning in 1867.

The Canadian Cabinet of 1867 looked like this:

<u>Name</u>	<u>Portfolio</u>	<u>Province &amp; Party</u>
J.A. Macdonald	Prime Minister, Justice and Attorney-General	Ontario-Conservative
G.E. Cartier	Militia & Defence	Quebec-Conservative
Leonard Tilley	Customs	N.B. - Liberal
Alexander Galt	Finance	Quebec - Liberal
W. Macdougall	Public Works	Ontario - Liberal
W.P. Howland	Inland Revenue	Ontario - Liberal
A.G. Archibald	Secretary for Provinces	Nova Scotia - Liberal
A.J.F. Blair	President of P.C.	Senate, Ontario- Liberal





<u>Name</u>	<u>Portfolio</u>	<u>Province &amp; Party</u>
Peter Mitchell	Fisheries	Senate, N.B.-Liberal
Alexander Campbell	Postmaster-General	Senate, Ontario - Conservative
J.C. Chapais	Agriculture	Senate, Quebec - Conservative
Hector Langevin	Secretary of State	Quebec - Conservative
Edward Kenny	Receiver-General	Senate-Nova Scotia- Conservative

Sir Joseph Pope pointed out: "Upon looking over this list it will be observed that two prominent names are wanting, Charles Tupper and D<sup>r</sup> Arcy McGee. Why were they not included? The reason is to be found in the attitude of Mr. Cartier who insisted upon having three French-Canadian representatives in the Cabinet. The Protestant minority of Lower Canada had also to be represented. Mr. McGee sat for a Lower Canadian constituency and was an Irish Roman Catholic. To have brought in three French-Canadian representatives, a Protestant representative and Mr. McGee would have raised the number of Quebec's ministers to five. Messrs. Howland and McDougall insisted on Ontario having one more Cabinet Minister than Quebec. To satisfy all parties would mean that Ontario and Quebec should have eleven ministers between them. To that Mr. Macdonald would by no means consent on the ground that when the other provinces were proportionately represented the Cabinet would be so large as to be unworkable. There seemed to be no solution of the difficulty and Mr. Macdonald was on the point of advising the Governor General to send for Mr. Brown when Mr. Tupper with rare disinterestedness placed his portfolio at the disposal of his leader, at the same time suggesting to him a means of overcoming the difficulty. We can imagine him saying, "As leader of the Confederate party in Nova Scotia I am entitled to office. In order to remove this difficulty which has arisen I am willing to forego my claims and in foregoing them to satisfy the legitimate aspirations of the Irish Catholic body. In my place appoint an Irish Catholic from Nova Scotia." 1

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1. Pope, Memoirs of Sir John A. Macdonald, V.I. pp.330-331.



At this point D<sup>r</sup> Arcy McGee also stepped down and Mr. Kenny, who apparently had little else to recommend him was in the Cabinet.

Thus was the principle of federal representation in the Canadian Cabinet established. Of the concept, Norman Rogers wrote:

"...it followed naturally that a Prime Minister of a federal state, wishing to consolidate his followers into a strong national party must take care to avoid the imputation that one province or section of the population was given a disproportionate influence on the formulation of policy."<sup>2</sup>

and this apparently was what Macdonald had set out to do.

But here one of the extraneous considerations which cannot be covered statistically came up. Confederation had been a joint effort of Liberals and Conservatives alike and moreover Macdonald was not sure enough of his personal following in Ontario that he could at present afford an appearance of factionalism. He therefore made his first Confederation Cabinet a coalition. He selected as ministers McDougall, Howland and Blair whom he considered to be popular enough among Ontario Liberals to carry several marginal constituencies for his men. Blair died in 1867 and Macdonald was able to slough off Howland and Macdougall

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2. Norman Rogers, "Federal Influences on the Canadian Cabinet", p. 106

3. Richard Cartwright, Reminiscences, p. 66 ff





fairly quietly but he had had to use them at first in order to secure for himself a solid following in Ontario. In their place Macdonald called upon Sir Francis Hincks, an old Liberal, now, after sixteen years as a colonial governor in the West Indies, ready to return to Canadian politics as a coalition-Liberal who was nearly a Conservative. His appointment caused Cartwright, hitherto a Conservative from Ontario, to cross the floor where he eventually became minister of Finance under Mackenzie and later served as Sir Wilfrid Laurier's oldest war-horse and minister of Trade and Commerce. Alexander Galt also left the Cabinet to sit as an independent shortly after Hincks' appointment, so the appointment of one man who added some administrative but little political strength to the Cabinet cost Macdonald at least two strong supporters and, if we are to believe Cartwright much of his popular support as well.<sup>4</sup>

The point here is that many of Macdonald's first Cabinet appointments were made simply for reasons of political necessity and that acting within what he considered to be the necessary framework of federalized representation he was nonetheless influenced by other factors as well. Another vital point is that Macdonald appeared to be agreeable to leaving the appointment of his Quebec ministers to Cartier who considered himself not so much Macdonald's Quebec

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4. Cartwright, loc. cit.



lieutenant as his political equal.<sup>5</sup> While information on this point is scanty it appears that Cartier was in charge of the Quebec appointees to the Cabinet and that, for the most part Macdonald left him alone in this respect.

If Macdonald's 1867 Cabinet established the precedent of federalized Cabinets, Alexander Mackenzie's Cabinet of 1873 confirmed it. His 1873 Cabinet was:

<u>Name</u>	<u>Portfolio</u>	<u>Province</u>
A. Mackenzie	Prime Minister and Public Works	Ontario
Edward Blake	Without Portfolio	Ontario
David Christie	Secretary of State	Ontario
Richard Cartwright	Finance	Ontario
D.A. Macdonald	Postmaster-General	Ontario
R.W. Scott	Without Portfolio	Ontario
A.A. Dorion	Justice	Quebec
Luc Letellier de St. Just	Agriculture	Quebec
Telesphore Fournier	Inland Revenue	Quebec
L.S. Huntingdon	President of Privy Council	Quebec
William Ross	Militia and Defense	Nova Scotia
Thomas Coffin	Receiver General	Nova Scotia

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5. Pope. loc.cit., the story that when, in 1867 Cartier received a lesser title from Queen Victoria than did Macdonald, their partnership was seriously threatened would tend to bear this out.





<u>Name</u>	<u>Portfolio</u>	<u>Province</u>
Albert J. Smith	Fisheries	New Brunswick
Isaac Burpee	Customs	New Brunswick
David Laird	Interior	Prince Edward Island

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Federally, this Cabinet was essentially the same as Macdonald's. There was one extra man from Ontario but David Christie shortly resigned and became speaker of the Senate with R.W. Scott taking his portfolio. Quebec had its three French ministers together with its one English and the representation of the maritimes was numerically the same as had been Macdonald's except that one portfolio was assigned to Prince Edward Island. But Mackenzie had no easy time setting up this Cabinet and no easy time once it was in office. His first problem arose because many Liberals felt that Lord Dufferin should have called upon either Edward Blake or Alexander Galt to form a ministry.<sup>7</sup> The lack of a call put Edward Blake into one of his seemingly perpetual sulks and he was drawn into the Cabinet only on the petition of most of the Ontario contingent and then would only take an appointment without portfolio and that only temporarily. Luther Holton, who had been a Liberal Finance minister in

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6. James Young, Public Men and Public Life, V.II, p.

7. R. Cartwright, Reminiscences, p. 121 ff





the United States was the logical choice for Finance but he adamantly refused (possibly because of illness) to enter the Cabinet as did Alfred Jones, the strongest Liberal in Nova Scotia. The Nova Scotia delegation therefore was extremely weak and was later to become a thorn in Mackenzie's side. Jones later did enter the Cabinet, but only in 1878, too late to be of much help to a falling government.

Dorion, the old Liberal from Quebec was the undisputed Quebec leader and Mackenzie apparently hoped to make him his permanent Quebec Lieutenant.<sup>8</sup> However, Dorion preferred to leave politics and shortly, when an appointment to the Quebec Supreme Court became available, he took it. From then on Mackenzie was without a Quebec lieutenant and seemed to move from one problem to another with his Quebec delegation.<sup>9</sup> Telesphore Fournier, an editor of Le National and one of Mackenzie's original choices from Quebec was an extremely able man but he exhibited rather too much fondness for the grape for Mackenzie's proper tastes and was considered unreliable. Letelier de St. Just was merely an old war horse with no more political ambition and not likely to provide leadership in Quebec. Fournier left the cabinet in 1875

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8. D.C. Thompson, Alexander Mackenzie, p. 170 ff.

9. Sister Teresa Avila Burke, "Mackenzie and His Cabinet", Canadian History Rev. v. 41, no. 2 (1960) p. 128.



and the choice for his successor lay between Wilfrid Laurier and J.E. Cauchon. Laurier showed promise but was still young while Cauchon was presumed to have considerable influence among the old guard Liberals in spite of his onetime support of Macdonald. He also was on good terms with the clergy and had a strong newspaper and his reputation for dishonesty could perhaps be forgotten, so he was chosen over Laurier.<sup>10</sup>

Laurier, as a representative of young Quebec Liberals refused to serve in the same Cabinet as Cauchon whose dishonesty soon came to the fore and Mackenzie was left in a quandry in Quebec, the more so as Luther Holton, the strongest English Liberal in Quebec had, at first, steadfastly refused to enter the Cabinet leaving Mackenzie with Lucius Huntington, a political lightweight whose chief claim to fame was the instigation of the Pacific Scandal. Holton later recanted but Huntington was now adamant in refusing to resign and as long as only one English-speaking Quebecker could be placed in the Cabinet Holton was left in the cold. When, eventually, space was found for Laurier in the Cabinet he was promptly beaten in Drummond-Arthabaska by a combination of ultramontane clergy and Conservatives and Mackenzie was eventually left in 1878 with a French delegation of Cauchon, Charles Alphonse Pelletier, a good but unspectacular French Liberal and Rodolphe Laflamme a good but again uninspiring Minister of Justice. Mackenzie never appears to have understood Quebec politics and the Quebec representation in the Cabinet was a perpetual thorn in his side.





Aside from Blake who was continually changing his mind as to whether he wanted to be in or out of the Cabinet but who seems to have been considered by his contemporaries to be a sine qua non of Liberal Cabinets, Mackenzie had little trouble with his Ontario delegation but the same was not true for Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. Both Ross and Coffin from Nova Scotia had been followers of Macdonald who left him over the Pacific scandal but they could hardly be considered first line Liberals and they had very little party support. They were apparently two of the worst Cabinet Ministers in our history; of Ross Mackenzie said: "The man's an ass and I wonder we never knew it with six years' knowledge of him,"<sup>11</sup> and Coffin he called "utterly useless". Coffin was so uncooperative about resigning that at one point Mackenzie considered legislating his office of Receiver-General out of existence.<sup>12</sup> By the time 1878 rolled around Mackenzie had the Nova Scotia delegation reasonably settled with A.G. Jones as leader but his basic problem in Nova Scotia was that there voters were either staunch Macdonald Conservatives or equally strong haters of the whole idea of Confederation. In New Brunswick, he had much less trouble but the New Brunswick delegation in the Macdonald Cabinet had been Tilley and Peter Mitchell and his pair of Albert Smith and Isaac Burpee were simply not up to that level.

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11. Ontario Archives, Blake Papers, Mackenzie to Blake, January 4, 1874 quoted in ibid p. 134.

12. loc. cit.



By 1876 Mackenzie appeared ready to give up in despair as he wrote:

"I have no sinecure in leading a crowd of French Liberals, Irish Catholics, Methodists, Free Traders, Protectionists, Eastern Province men, Western men, Central Canada men, Columbians, Manitobans, all jealous of each other and striving to obtain some advantage or concession. I always knew it was very hard to keep Liberals together but my experience has been far in excess of my utmost belief." 13

In fact Mackenzie was probably something less than a model of perpetual tact in riding herd on his party but his difficulties do indicate some of the problems that can confront a Prime Minister when he sets out to choose a Cabinet. One of his primary problems was his failure, after the elevation of Dorion to the bench, ever to find a satisfactory leader in Quebec to whom he could turn over his French-Canadian problems and his personal lack of understanding of Quebec politics made it unlikely he could do a satisfactory job himself. For our purposes his difficulties illustrate the sort of problems which can beset a Prime Minister aside from those of sheer federalism and biculturalism in selecting a Cabinet.

We now leap ahead some distance in time, unfortunately passing over Laurier's years as Prime Minister to briefly examine the Cabinets of R.L. Borden.

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13. Mackenzie to Charles, P.A.C., Mackenzie Papers, October 20, 1876 in ibid p. 128.





Borden's first Cabinet, chosen in 1911, consisted of:

<u>Name</u>	<u>Portfolio</u>	<u>Province</u>
R.L. Borden	Prime Minister and President of Privy Council	Nova Scotia
G.E. Foster	Trade and Commerce	Ontario
Robert Rogers	Interior	Manitoba
Frederic D. Monk	Public Works	Quebec
Francis Cochrane	Railways and Canals	Ontario
William T. White	Finance	Ontario
L.P. Pelletier	Postmaster-General	Quebec
J.D. Hazen	Marine, Fisheries, Naval Service	New Brunswick
C.J. Doherty	Justice	Quebec
Sam Hughes	Militia and Defense	Ontario
Martin Burrell	Agriculture	British Columbia
W.J. Roche	Secretary of State	Manitoba
T.W. Crothers	Labour	Ontario
W.B. Nantel	Inland Revenue, Mines	Quebec
J.D. Reid	Customs	Ontario
G.H. Perley	Without Portfolio	Quebec
A.E. Kemp	"	Ontario
J.A. Lougheed	"	Senate, Alberta





Again we see that the distribution of seats among provinces is more or less what we would expect in a Cabinet of this size. There are seven Ontario members and five from Quebec, three French and two English, two from Manitoba and one each from New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, British Columbia and Alberta. There is one senator in this Cabinet. The Cabinet is somewhat larger than its predecessors and in fact large Cabinets do not seem to have bothered Borden in the least. There is perhaps an overrepresentation of English-speaking members from the two central provinces, nine in all, but this is understandable when we consider the circumstances of the 1911 election in which the "moneyed interests" of the central provinces threw their support very heavily behind Borden in an attempt to defeat Laurier and reciprocity. Borden does not mention it but this factor undoubtedly weighed in his selection of ministers.

Borden himself has left a record of why certain of these men had been chosen.<sup>14</sup> Sam Hughes was perhaps his most controversial appointment and was in fact even criticized by Lord Grey, the Governor General, but Borden felt that he had proven sufficiently loyal and energetic to deserve a Cabinet appointment. Borden apparently lectured Hughes on past indiscretions and he admitted his faults but "discretion did not thereafter prove to be a prominent characteristic".<sup>15</sup>

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14. Borden, Memoirs, p. 330 ff.

15. Ibid., p. 330.



Robert Rogers from Manitoba wanted Railways and Canals and apparently fought hard for it but assorted backers of the Conservative campaign chest apparently did not approve of him for that portfolio and it went to Cochrane with Rogers getting Interior.

A real battle apparently developed between W.T. White and G.E. Foster over the ministry of Finance. Foster's memoirs contain a great deal of material on his fight for appointment to this portfolio and indicate the type of infighting that can go on in Cabinet formation.<sup>16</sup> Foster apparently heard soon after the election that he was not to be offered Finance whereupon he contacted his more politically powerful friends and had them mount a telegraphic and postal campaign on his behalf. Since the Toronto Liberal-Conservative association was an extremely powerful one its pressure must have been hard for Borden to ignore and when support was added from big business in Montreal it must have been doubly difficult. But Sir Thomas White had been a commanding figure in the campaign and was an ex-Liberal whom Borden very much wanted in the Cabinet so he resisted all pressure on Foster's behalf. Foster had eventually to be satisfied with Trade and Commerce.

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16. W.S. Wallace, Memoirs of Sir George Foster, pp. 156-161.





J.D. Reid who became minister of Customs had at times supported Laurier and was therefore not too much trusted by Borden but Cochrane, who had already been selected as Railways and Canals, insisted on his presence and Borden eventually took him in. Apparently Borden's first choice as a British Columbia representative was the Premier of that province, McBride who had led the campaign in British Columbia and been strongly protectionist. He was accordingly invited to join the cabinet but was enjoined to reply immediately. McBride however, was not one to make up his mind quickly and Borden apparently grew impatient; the British Columbia posting went to Martin Burrell who, if weaker, was quicker to make up his mind and accepted immediately.

The Quebec French ministers were apparently not decided by Borden alone. Of them he said:

"The selection of ministers from the Province of Quebec occasioned considerable thought and discussion ... Mr. Monk, as Quebec leader was entitled to an important portfolio and colleagues selected with his approval were Mr. Pelletier and Mr. Nantel."<sup>17</sup>

It seems likely then, that Frederick Monk held at least a veto power over the appointment of Quebec ministers and was consulted at some length over their selection.

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17. R.L. Borden, op. cit., p. 331, italics mine



Again it should be pointed out that Borden chose his first Cabinet within the usual federal framework but as we have seen the appointment of many of his ministers was accompanied by a good deal of other consideration over their personalities, their loyalties and the interests behind them. These again are things which cannot show up in a statistical analysis.

In 1920 Arthur Meighen took over the leadership of the Liberal-Conservative party from R.L. Borden and became the ninth Prime Minister of Canada. In 1921 he asked for the resignations of all of his ministers and he accepted those of six. His 1921 Cabinet then became:

<u>Name</u>	<u>Portfolio</u>	<u>Province</u>
Arthur Meighen	Prime Minister and External Affairs	Manitoba
H.H. Stevens	Trade and Commerce	British Columbia
Sir J. Lougheed	Interior, Mines, Indian Affairs	Senate, Alberta
F.B. McCurdy	Public Works	Nova Scotia
J.A. Stewart	Railways and Canals	Ontario
H.L. Drayton	Finance and Receiver-General	Ontario
Louis Belley	Postmaster-General	Ontario
C.C. Ballantyne	Marine, Fisheries, Naval Service	Quebec





<u>Name</u>	<u>Portfolio</u>	<u>Province</u>
R.B. Bennett	Justice and A.G.	Alberta
Hugh Guthrie	Militia and Defense	Ontario
Rodolphe Monty	Secretary of State	Quebec
G.F. Robertson	Labour	Senate, Ontario
J.W. Edwards	Immigration and Colonization, Health	Ontario
J.A. Normand	President of Privy Council	Quebec
J.B.M. Baxter	Customs and Excise	New Brunswick
S.F. Tolmie	Agriculture	British Columbia
R.J. Manion	Soldiers' Civil Re-establishment	Ontario
E.K. Spinney	Without Portfolio	Nova Scotia
A.E. Kemp	Without Portfolio	Ontario
Edmund Bristol	Without Portfolio	Ontario
H.R. Wilson	Without Portfolio	Saskatchewan

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As far as federal representation was concerned, this Cabinet again approximated the normal in Canadian politics for it had one Cabinet Minister each from Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, New Brunswick, two from British Columbia and Nova Scotia, seven from Ontario and four from Quebec of whom three were French and finally two Senators. The senators were from Alberta and Ontario. The remarkable thing about this Cabinet however was the weakness of its French contingent whose





"leading" member was Louis Belley who had not sat in Parliament since 1896 and then for only four years. Meighen experienced extreme difficulties in Quebec as a result of his having piloted the Military Service Act through Parliament in 1917 and any Quebec politicians of any repute felt it was suicide to run with him in 1921. Personally, Meighen would have preferred as his Quebec lieutenant Albert Sévigny who aside from Blondin had been the only French conscriptionist in the 1917 Union Cabinet. But his convictions had cost Sévigny his seat in 1917 and it was impossible for him to muster any support in Quebec.<sup>19</sup> Esioff Patenaude, who left Borden in 1917 had more political power than any other French Conservative and was the logical choice as a Quebec lieutenant. He was approached by Meighen and agreed to work with him if six propositions he put up were fulfilled. They included:

"Proportional representation according to population in the Cabinet, the French element of the province of Quebec to be represented by at least three Ministers and that of the rest of the country by at least one Minister and this representation in every case to be increased according to population."<sup>20</sup>

Meighen readily agreed to this and the other propositions but before the December election Patenaude backed out leaving Meighen once again without a French lieutenant. When Patenaude finally did agree to run in 1925 he issued the statement:

"I am in every way free. I am free from Mr. Meighen even as I am free from Mr. King."<sup>21</sup>

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19. Roger Graham, Arthur Meighen V.2. p. 11 ff.

20. Graham, op. cit., p. 16

21. R. Graham, op. cit., p. 323



With this Meighen was forced to agree and had they formed a Cabinet immediately in 1926 the inference was clear that the management of the Quebec contingent was to be up to Patenaude alone.

Meanwhile, in 1921 Meighen was left alone to try to rebuild a shattered organization in French Canada. It apparently occurred to him to try to do so by rallying the protectionist element of Quebec and French politics to his side and he tried in turn to attract P.J. Veniot (then Public Works Minister in New Brunswick), L.J. Gauthier a protectionist-Liberal and finally G.H. Boivin the Liberal Member of Parliament for Shefford County in the Eastern Townships to his Cabinet. Veniot turned him down, and later joined Mackenzie King's Cabinet, Gauthier crossed the floor but Meighen then apparently decided he was not strong enough and was merely office seeking and Boivin actually agreed to come in but changed his mind at the last instant when his riding association warned him he would be defeated if he ran with Meighen. Meighen was again left with no strong French-Canadian ministers and was forced to appoint Belley, Rodolphe Monty and J.P. Normand all of whom were of inferior standing and all of whom immediately lost their seats.





Newton Rowell had departed back to the Liberals, Sir Thomas White was gone and Sir George Foster retired in September 1921 at the age of 75. Borden had, of course, left active political life. Meighen was a victim of extremely unpropitious circumstance: the Cabinet he inherited had grown old and many of its ministers were Union-Liberals anxious to return to their old party. He was hated in Quebec and without a Quebec lieutenant and it was hardly surprising that his government met disaster in December 1921. Again circumstances other than those which appear in the statistical analysis had determined the choice of many of his ministers.

The Cabinet which followed the 1921 election consisted of:

<u>Name</u>	<u>Portfolio</u>	<u>Province</u>
W.L.M. King	Prime Minister, President of Privy Council, External Affairs	Ontario
W.S. Fielding	Finance	Nova Scotia
G.P. Graham	Militia and Defense Naval Service	Ontario
Charles Murphy	Post Office	Ontario
Raoul Dandurand	Without Portfolio	Senate, Quebec
H.S. Béland	Soldiers' Civil Re-establishment and Health	Quebec
Sir Lomer Gouin	Justice and A.G.	Quebec
Jacques Bureau	Customs & Excise	Quebec



<u>Name</u>	<u>Portfolio</u>	<u>Province</u>
Ernest Lapointe	Marine and Fisheries	Quebec
D.D. McKenzie	Solicitor General	Nova Scotia
J.A. Robb	Trade and Commerce	Quebec
T.A. Low	Without Portfolio	Ontario
A.B. Copp	Secretary of State	New Brunswick
W.C. Kennedy	Railways and Canals	Ontario
C.L. Stewart	Interior, Indian Affairs, Mines	Alberta
W.R. Motherwell	Agriculture	Saskatchewan
James Murdock	Labour	Ontario
J.E. Sinclair	Without Portfolio	Prince Edward Island
J.H. King	Public Works	British Columbia <sup>22</sup>

This Cabinet, in which the usual federal amenities were preserved cost King fully as much trouble as had some of its predecessors for their Prime Ministers.<sup>23</sup> Firstly, King believed sufficiently strongly in the representation of the provinces that he was determined, in spite of the fact that he had received only five seats west of Ontario to represent them all in his Cabinet. He had also to represent both Laurier and Unionist Liberals and he strongly wanted to get some members

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22. P.A.C. M.C.M., 43-46

23. See R.M. Dawson, Mackenzie King, V.1, p. 357 ff. Dawson's description of King's problems in forming a cabinet is very complete and provides many valuable insights.





of the newly powerful Progressive movement into his Cabinet. Furthermore, sixteen Members of Parliament had a claim to Cabinet posts by virtue of previous experience in federal or provincial Cabinets.

Moreover King's position as Liberal leader was as yet far from a secure one and he could ill afford to place his rivals in a position where they could threaten him. Thus Fielding might be given Finance but he must be carefully watched and Gouin, with fifteen years as Liberal leader in Quebec must be kept away from the presidency of the Privy Council where he might be considered a co-leader of the party. King therefore kept that and external affairs for himself.<sup>24</sup>

King went over his first selections with Andrew Haydon, the Secretary of the National Liberal Party Organization for his suggestions.<sup>25</sup> The original list included the names of three Progressives including Drury, the U.F.O. Premier of Ontario and Thomas Crerar the federal leader of that rather divided band of men. King was extremely anxious to re-absorb these men into the Liberal party (and in fact all of them did eventually re-enter it) and would have preferred an arrangement as tight as possible leading eventually to union. But it was

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24. Ibid., p. 359-60.

25. Ibid., p. 361.





part of the ideology of the more radical wing of the progressive movement to avoid the old parties at all costs and in fact to shun all of what they termed "partyism" and while there is some evidence that Crerar and Drury were interested, the more radical of their followers blocked any move on their part to enter King's Cabinet. King therefore had to turn his back on the Progressives and look elsewhere for his agrarian ministers. W.R. Motherwell from Saskatchewan as a sitting member was an obvious choice and from the former Alberta Cabinet he drew Charles Stewart and found him a safe seat in Quebec.

In Quebec he persuaded Gouin to take on the portfolio of Justice and Attorney-General and gave Ernest Lapointe whom he considered his most reliable Quebec man his choice of portfolios. He also submitted all of his Quebec appointees to Lapointe for approval.<sup>26</sup> It would seem that from the very first he considered Lapointe as his Quebec lieutenant and more. He also had the problem in Quebec of keeping the power of Montreal finance down to a minimum. Their representatives in the Cabinet were Lomer Gouin and James Robb the latter of whom was given Trade and Commerce but

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26. loc.cit. Lapointe originally asked for Justice but later voluntarily surrendered this post for marine and fisheries in order to conciliate the reactionary right wing of Quebec Liberalism led by Gouin.



this was largely a matter of keeping the party's Montreal backers satisfied. He was also faced, as all Liberal Prime Ministers seem to be with reconciling the old and young wings of the Liberal party in Quebec. That he leaned most heavily upon Lapointe is a measure of his preference for the younger Liberals but here was another place where he was forced to walk a line.

In 1925 King made substantial changes to this Cabinet. Again he found a number of personal and political problems were strongly influencing his Cabinet choices. He very much wanted Dunning, then the Premier of Saskatchewan in the federal Cabinet but he was not sure whether his still tenuous hold on the party leadership could survive bringing such a formidable rival into the Cabinet. Dunning too had his doubts about the strength of the Liberal party and wanted to play it safe.<sup>27</sup> He did not enter the Cabinet until after the 1925 election in which he was not a candidate, but once in he became King's western mainstay and a close approach to an all powerful western lieutenant.

In Ontario Graham and Murphy were ready to retire and Low and Murdock were not strong either administratively or politically but to get adequate replacements for these men and to strengthen his Quebec contingent even more, he had to look outside the Members of Parliament.

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27. Blair Neatby, Mackenzie King, v.2, pp. 66 ff.





He eventually chose Herbert Marler with strong connections in the Montreal business world and Vincent Massey but as his luck would have it both were defeated in the 1925 election. In fact the 1925 election resulted in all five of his Ontario ministers losing their seats.

Following the 1925 election King continued his attempts to re-build his Cabinet. He brought in the former Progressive leader, Robert Forke from Manitoba to represent the Liberal-Progressives but he was unable to replace either Dr. King from British Columbia or Charles Stewart from Alberta about both of whom he had misgivings.<sup>28</sup> In Ontario he kicked Charles Murphy upstairs to the Senate and brought in Peter Heenan.

"King knew that Heenan was 'not an able man' but this disadvantage was outweighed by the fact that he was a Roman Catholic, that as a locomotive engineer he seemed a suitable minister of Labour and that his appointment would give representation to new (Northern) Ontario".<sup>29</sup>

Also in Ontario King wanted to bring in N.W. Rowell to reform the Customs department which had suffered considerable disrepute under Jacques Bureau. But Rowell was a former Unionist Liberal who had managed to alienate almost every Liberal in the province at one time or other and King was therefore forced to bring in William Euler, a dour German from Kitchener who did the requisite clean up work.

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28. Neatby, op.cit., p. 171 ff.

29. loc.cit. p. 173



The rest of King's eastern appointments were routine but in the west he was still trying desperately to get Progressive support. He found however that "neither in Alberta nor in Manitoba was there a politician who could bring to the government the support of the Progressive members elected in their provinces."<sup>30</sup>

From the Maritimes after 1926 King brought in James Ralston and P.J. Veniot. We have met Veniot earlier, when discussing Meighen's Cabinets -- he was by now a former premier of New Brunswick. He was given the job of Postmaster-General where in spite of the fact that or perhaps because he was "not exactly a moralist" he did an able job. Both Maritime Cabinet Minister appointees then were from outside Parliament.

In 1929 James Robb died relieving King of the task of demoting him and Dunning, a free trader of course, being from Saskatchewan, was given Finance. Thomas Crerar, whom King had long wooed was also finally enticed back to politics to replace Forke and brace up his weak hold on Manitoba and given the then important portfolio of Railways and Canals.

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30. loc.cit. p. 95.





In 1930, just before his unsuccessful appeal to the country King moved again finally boosting Dr. King from British Columbia, whom he had long considered inept, to the Senate, and appointing Ian Mackenzie, a younger British Columbia Liberal in his place.<sup>31</sup> Prince Edward Island had long been without a minister but with an election coming it seemed a good idea to give her one. None of the sitting members would do so Dr. Cyrus MacMillan was taken from the staff of McGill, placed in a seat on the Island which had at least been his birthplace, and made minister of Fisheries.

These are by no means all of the appointments made by King before 1930 but they again illustrate the point of this chapter, that influences aside from what we might consider the normal federal pre-requisites are very often vital in Cabinet formation.

One last point needs to be made in this chapter but it is perhaps at this point vital. While we have just spent some time looking at the many factors that may influence Cabinet formation they by no means negate the statistical analysis of the preceding chapters. We have already seen that certain generalizations are true for the men who have made up the Canadian Cabinet and that these generalizations are fairly constant from generation to generation.

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31. loc.cit. p. 332





They form the background out of which Cabinet Ministers come and are hence vital in the whole process of Cabinet formation and Cabinet government for by knowing the background we know a great deal about the individuals and they can be found out in no other way save by statistical description. For the formation of accurate and testable generalizations about the general type of man who becomes a cabinet minister, we must rely on statistical data. This chapter has been included to add a note of balance and to point out that at any specific moment certain factors not susceptible to statistical analysis may affect certain parts of Cabinet structure. But the point is simply that although political structures are not always susceptible to purely statistical description, certain background characteristics and certain types of experience again and again seem to make the road to political power within the structures of either of our cultures smoother. While individuals tend to vary around a certain ideal type, they still usually approximate it rather closely and the statistical analysis used as the backbone of this report is an attempt to show what these types were.



## CHAPTER VI

## CONCLUSIONS

It has been our major purpose throughout this report to attempt to examine what, typically, goes into the making of a Cabinet Minister of either French or English-Canadian ethnic orientation with a view to examining the Cabinet as an instrument of accommodation. That it is intended to be such as well as a decision-making body is borne out by much of the material herein, especially in Chapters II and V where we saw that in almost every case the Cabinet has contained representation from each of the provinces with the frequent exception of Prince Edward Island. This representation has been proportional to population only within extremely broad limits; rather except for Ontario and Quebec and occasionally British Columbia, Nova Scotia and Manitoba the principle one province -- one portfolio has been largely adhered to. Furthermore we saw that the Cabinet has been used as an instrument of ethnic accommodation for in the highest level of our political elite the French have always been represented by at least three and sometimes four or more Cabinet Ministers and we have seen that Prime Ministers will go to great lengths to ensure proper French representation.





We have also seen other trends over time. The increasing nationalization of federal politics has been indicated by the decrease in numbers of Ministers who have had provincial legislative experience and as their provincial experience has decreased we might expect their commitment to federal politics to have increased. We have seen that slowly -- very slowly -- the routes of entry to the Cabinet have been broadening so that it is now possible for even a French Cabinet Minister to be recruited easily from outside that very narrow band of men who make up the professional class. We have seen that educationally, the members of the Cabinet from French and English Canada grow more alike, the English rising to meet the French standards. Their political careers have become more alike as the French serve longer apprenticeships in politics and the English get less and less training in provincial politics and their non-cabinet career patterns at last appear to be becoming more alike. Thus since the last war it has become possible for French who are not lawyers to gain Cabinet rank and a broader spectrum of French-Canadian life is being represented in the Cabinet.

All of these changes should tend to make the Cabinet a more effective means of accommodating French and English-Canadian interests in Canada for as the backgrounds of



Cabinet Ministers become more alike it should become easier for them to speak to each other on terms which both can understand and hence to bargain together more effectively.

Yet a number of weaknesses in Cabinet personnel have been uncovered here too. Thus, while it has been traditional and indeed mandatory to represent the English-speaking population of Quebec in the Cabinet, it has only occasionally been thought necessary to represent the French-speaking population of the rest of Canada. The present Cabinet is not deficient in this respect but most of its predecessors have been. Since this is a very sizeable majority with many common interests, it would appear necessary that it be represented in the Cabinet as a matter of right by one Cabinet Minister.

The social background from which the French-Canadian Cabinet Minister has sprung would seem to have been another hidden weakness in the French contingent in the Cabinet vis-à-vis its English counterpart. We have seen that the French Cabinet Ministers have been drawn almost exclusively from the very small professional classes and that indeed usually some seventy to seventy-five per cent of French-Canadian Cabinet Ministers have been lawyers. The English have also grossly overdrawn from their professional classes in making Cabinets but not to nearly this extent. Educationally





almost every French-Canadian Cabinet Minister has come from the collèges classiques where they have all received a classical education whereas the English-Canadians have come from a far broader educational spectrum. Until the last war it was a virtual certainty that no French-Canadian businessman would get into the Cabinet and the same applied to almost every other occupational class save farmers, and of course, the lawyers.

As we have seen, there has never been any effort to make the Cabinet socially representative. In its personnel it has always been an elite body and while we are concerned here not with its representativeness but rather with the extent to which it can effectively make decisions and accommodations at the upper level of Canadian politics, nonetheless it would seem that the excessively narrow base from which it is recruited would tend to mitigate against its effectiveness as an arbiter of interests. This is far more true for the French than the English contingent. The suggestion is not that the Cabinet should be more representative of all the social levels of society, for most construction labourers would clearly be ludicrously out of place in a Cabinet meeting, but only that more of the businessmen and merchants, the public servants and the intellectuals who appear in parliament should appear also in the Cabinet.





There are reasons why this is inconvenient -- the most strongly committed of our political class appear to come from lawyers and they are perhaps in general the most articulate debaters in the House. These qualities are certainly vital but a somewhat broader representation at the top might appear wise.

There is evidence that the present Cabinet has moved in this direction and since the war there is evidence of a much broader recruiting base for French-Canadian Ministers. There have been difficulties in the present Cabinet not only for the well publicized reasons but because some of the more politically amateur of its members have not proven to be the most articulate defenders of their departmental policies on the floor of the House. However, this does not appear to have mitigated against its effectiveness as a decision-making body nor as an arbiter of Federalism and it might be hoped that trends in this direction will be continued.

The French-Canadian contingent in the Cabinet would appear to be weakened relative to its English counterpart as well as by its lack of political experience. We have seen that French-Canadian ministers are less likely than their English fellows to have had experience in provincial politics



and that they serve rather a shorter apprenticeship in the Federal House before they are called to the Privy Council. These two factors would seem likely to make their service somewhat less weighty than those of their English counterparts. The likelihood is increased even more when we recall that on an average they serve for about two years shorter periods in the Cabinet than their English fellows. This difference of about one-third in length of service means that at any given time there are probably considerably more senior English-speaking ministers than French. Since it is the ministers with the most experience in Cabinet councils who are most important in decision-making this leads to a sort of hidden under-representation of the French in the Federal Cabinet. Moreover there is evidence that this trend has increased since the war. This would seem to be unfortunate but there is little that can be suggested to alleviate it for a Prime Minister must take what he can get in the way of political experience. The lack of politicians with strong connections with Quebec politics would appear to be especially unfortunate for if the French-Canadians consider Quebec politics peculiarly their own it would be far better for national decision making if it was to be strongly represented in the Federal Cabinet. Yet many Quebec politicians appear to prefer to stay at home. How to entice a steady flow of some





of the best of them to Ottawa has been a perennial problem of Prime Ministers and would appear likely to continue to be so.

One field, however, where a sort of hidden under-representation can be rectified is in the field of the distribution of portfolios. We say in Chapter II that many of the most important portfolios, especially those dealing with money have gone exclusively to English-speaking Cabinet Ministers. Perhaps it is incorrect to equate weight in the Cabinet with portfolio but I rather think not. A minister of Finance, by virtue of his position simply has more power than does one of Forestry and when we add to this the fact of considerably shorter stays in the Cabinet for French-Canadian Ministers we find a very serious underweighting of their position indeed. Nor is this something that could not be corrected. Finance Ministers and Ministers of Trade and Commerce are often thought of as representatives of eastern finance and many of them have been, but many more have not. W.S. Fielding was from Nova Scotia yet he held the post longer than any other man, and Charles Dunning, appointed by King in 1929 was a low-tariff man from Saskatchewan. Similarly H.H. Stevens, Minister of Trade and Commerce from 1930 to 1935 was from British Columbia and no great friend of eastern capital. The same has been true



for several other Ministers of Trade and Commerce and the only reason that no French-Canadian has been appointed to either of these posts would seem to be an outmoded tradition. If any recommendation can be taken from this report it should be, I think, that French Canadians must in the interests of national accommodation be given more of the bigger portfolios in order that they may speak equally with their English colleagues in the Cabinet.

In a sense the suggestions on Cabinet personnel presented in this conclusion are futile, for the Cabinet is first and foremost a political body and subject to all the vagaries of politics. We have seen the thousand and one pressures that can act upon a Prime Minister when choosing his Cabinet and one cannot help but be sympathetic with the men who walk this political tightrope among the myriad interests of a pluralistic, geographically diversified and bicultural country. But, while the Cabinet has, by and large, been a fairly successful instrument of accommodation in a federal society it could be made better without instituting any of those institutional reforms of which Canadian politicians are so leery. A little more attention to the distribution of portfolios between French and English and a willingness not to be overly bound by outmoded tradition in this respect together with an attempt to represent a somewhat



broader spectrum of French Canada's newly emerging technical and industrial elite and a little more willingness to raid the Quebec legislature and Cabinet for talent would go far towards making the Cabinet more a meeting place of equals. Until it becomes that, until both major ethnic orientations have members, though not necessarily numbers, of equal strength, the Cabinet will be a less perfect instrument for reconciling differences than it can be. In a period when the two cultures have trouble communicating with each other it is vital that they be at least able to speak as between equals at the top and it is to be hoped that the Cabinet will move so as to make this possible. It is perhaps the most vital and important of our political institutions and its personnel must be picked with this in mind.





TABLE APPENDIX-1

PROVINCE REPRESENTED BY ETHNIC ORIENTATION  
OF CABINET MINISTERS

Province Ethnic Ori- entation	N.W.T. Pre 1905	P.E.I.	N.B.	N.S.	Nfld.	Que.	Ont.	Man.	Sask.	Alta.	B.C.	N.W.T.	TOTAL IN ROW
English No. %	1 0.4	8 3.2	24 9.7	30 12.1	3 1.2	29 11.7	103 41.7	17 6.9	8 3.2	8 3.2	16 6.5	0 0.0	247
French No. %	0 0	0 0.0	3 3.5	0 0.0	0 0.0	79 91.9	2 2.3	1 1.2	1 1.2	1 1.2	0 0.0	0 0.0	86



TABLE APPEND IX-2

ETHNIC ORIENTATION OF CABINET MINISTERS BY PLACE OF BIRTH  
(FIGURES IN PERCENTAGES)

Place of Birth Ethnic Orientation	N.W.F.	P.E.I.	N.B.	N.S.	Nfld.	Que.	Ont.	Man.	Sask.	Alta.	B.C.	England & Wales	Scotland	Ireland	U.S.A.	Other	TOTAL N IN ROW
English	0.0	3.6	10.8	13.3	0.8	11.2	42.2	1.6	0.4	0.4	1.6	5.6	4.4	1.6	2.4	0.0	249
French	0.0	0.0	2.3	0.0	0.0	87.5	4.5	1.1	0	1.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.4	0.0	88





TABLE APPENDIX - 3

DISTRIBUTION OF FRENCH & NON-FRENCH POPULATION BETWEEN QUEBEC & REST OF CANADA - 1871-1961  
(ALL FIGURES X 10<sup>3</sup>)

	1871 <sup>1</sup>	1881 <sup>2</sup>	1891 <sup>3</sup>	1901 <sup>3</sup>	1911 <sup>3</sup>	1921 <sup>3</sup>	1931 <sup>3</sup>	1941 <sup>3</sup>	1951 <sup>3</sup>	1961 <sup>3</sup>
FRENCH-SPEAKING LIVING IN QUEBEC	No.	1073.8	N/A	1322.1 <sup>c</sup>	1606.5 <sup>c</sup>	1889.3 <sup>c</sup>	2270.1 <sup>c</sup>	2695.0 <sup>c</sup>	3327.1 <sup>c</sup>	4241.3 <sup>d</sup>
% of Quebec Population		78.0		80.1	80.1	80.0	79.0	80.9	82.0	80.6
% of all French Canadians		85.9		80.2	77.9	77.0	77.5	77.4	77.0	76.6
NON FRENCH IN QUEBEC	No.	261.7	N/A	326.8	399.3	471.2	604.6	636.9	728.6	1017.9
% of Quebec population		22.0		19.9	19.9	20.0	21.0	19.1	18.0	19.4
% of non-French Canadians		10.9		8.8	7.8	7.4	8.1	7.9	7.6	8.0
FRENCH-SPEAKING OUTSIDE QUEBEC	No.	153.0	N/A	327.3	455.2	563.4	657.9	788.0	992.1	1299.0
% of French Canadians		14.1		19.8	22.1	23.0	22.5	22.6	23.0	23.4
% of Canada		4.4		6.1	6.3	6.4	6.3	6.8	7.1	7.1
Population of Quebec		1191.5	1488.5 <sup>a</sup>	1648.9 <sup>a</sup>	2005.8 <sup>a</sup>	2360.5 <sup>a</sup>	2874.7 <sup>a</sup>	3331.9 <sup>a</sup>	4055.7 <sup>a</sup>	5259.2 <sup>b</sup>
Population of French Canadians		1082.9	N/A	1649.4	2061.7	2452.7	2928.0	3483.0	4319.2	5540.3
Population of Non French Canadians		2403.0	N/A	372.9	5144.9	6335.2	7448.8	8023.6	9609.2	12697.9

1. CANADA CENSUS, 1871, V.1, p. 332, p. 424

2. CANADA CENSUS, 1891, V.1, p. 300, p. 404

3. a. CANADA CENSUS, 1951, V.1, Table 1, p. 1

b. CANADA CENSUS, 1961, V.1, Part 2, Bulletin 5, Table 34

c. QUEBEC STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK, 1961, p. 88

d. QUEBEC STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK, 1962, p. 53

\* Includes some fairly substantial minorities other than Br. Isles e.g. in 1961 about 40% of the non-French population of Quebec were not Br. Isles stock either. See Quebec Statistical Year Book 1962, p. 53.



TABLE APPENDIX - 4

HIGHEST EDUCATIONAL LEVEL ATTAINED  
BY PARTY AND PERIOD  
(FIGURES IN PERCENTAGES)

Highest Educational Level Party and Period	No Formal Education	Elementary or Grammar School	Secondary School	College Classique	University Undergraduate	University Postgraduate*	Law	Other or N/A	Total N in row
1867 - 1896									
Cons	1.6	9.7	14.5	1.6	3.2	11.3	53.3	3.2	61
Libs	0.0	17.4	26.1	0.0	0.0	4.4	43.5	8.7	19
1896 - 1921									
Cons	0.0	3.3	10.0	0.0	16.7	6.7	56.7	6.7	30
Libs	3.2	12.9	3.2	3.2	9.6	12.9	51.6	3.2	31
1921 - 1948									
Cons	0.0	12.8	8.5	0.0	12.8	12.8	48.9	4.3	47
Libs	0.0	11.8	11.8	1.5	8.8	8.8	55.9	1.5	68
1948 - 1965									
Cons	0.0	0.0	5.3	2.7	18.4	23.6	50.0	0.0	38
Libs	0.0	2.6	5.2	0.0	26.3	7.9	52.6	5.2	38
TOTALS									
Cons	0.5	7.3	10.2	1.1	11.3	13.5	52.0	3.4	176
Libs	0.6	10.6	10.6	1.3	11.9	8.8	52.5	3.7	156
All	0.6	8.9	10.4	1.2	11.6	11.3	52.2	3.6	332

\*Does not include Law.





TABLE APPENDIX-5

HIGHEST EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF NEW  
MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT BY PERIOD<sup>1</sup>  
(FIGURES IN PERCENTAGES)

Educational Level Period	No Uni- versity	Some Uni- versity	Univer- sity Degree	Total N. in Row
1867-1899    %	43.3	26.1	30.6	644
1900-1921    %	47.8	14.5	37.5	580
1922-1945    %	32.6	19.9	42.9	541
1946-1964    %	23.2	16.6	52.2	473
TOTALS	38.4	20.1	41.4	2238

1. Table adapted from data supplied by R.R. March.





TABLE APPENDIX - 6

ATTENDANCE AT SELECTED COLLEGES CLASSIQUES BY PERIOD

COLLEGE CLASSIQUE PERIOD	Total N in Row	Ste Marie	St. Laurent	Notre Dame	Jean de Bréboeuf	St. Joseph	St. Hyacinthe	Nicolet	Québec	Lévis	Loyola	Ste Anne de la Pocatière	Rimouski	Chicoutimi	Joliette	Other	N/A
1867-1921	38	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	6 15.8	7 18.4	7 18.4	0 0	0 0	1 2.6	0 0	0 0	1 2.6	12 31.6	4 10.5
1921-1965	48	3 6.3	0 0	0 0	0 0	2 4.2	0 0	3 6.3	5 10.4	2 4.2	2 4.2	2 4.2	2 4.2	2 4.2	0 0	20 41.7	5 10.4
Totals	86	3 3.5	0 0	0 0	0 0	2 2.3	6 7.0	10 11.6	12 14.0	2 2.3	2 2.3	3 3.5	2 2.3	2 2.3	1 1.2	32 37.2	9 10.5



TABLE APPENDIX - 7

ATTENDANCE AT ENGLISH SPEAKING PRIVATE SCHOOLS BY PERIOD

PRIVATE SCHOOL PERIOD	Did not Attend*	Upper Canada College	St. Andrews	Trinity College School	Bishop College-School	Other	N/A
1867-1921	94 64.8	4 2.8	0 0	0 0	0 0	33 22.8	14 9.7
1921-65	139 72.0	6 3.1	1 0.5	1 0.5	4 2.1	26 13.5	16 8.3
Totals	233 68.9	10 3.0	1 0.3	1 0.3	4 1.2	59 17.5	30 8.9

\* The configuration of tables appendix 6 & 7 is different with regard to this column. Since a vast majority of French Cabinet Ministers did attend Collèges Classiques it was not necessary to show how many did not attend. Since a sizeable majority of English Cabinet Ministers did not attend Private School this column is included in this table.





TABLE APPENDIX - 8

RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION OF CABINET MINISTERS  
BY PARTY & PERIOD (FIGURES IN PERCENTAGES)

RELIGION PARTY PERIOD	ROMAN CATHOLIC	ANGLICAN	PREBYTERIAN	METHODIST & U.C.C.	OTHER CHRISTIAN	NON OTHER	N/A	TOTAL N IN ROW
1867-1896 CONSERVATIVE	% 33.1	% 17.7	% 24.2	% 9.7	% 12.9	% -	% 4.8	61
LIBERAL	45.7	12.5	12.5	4.2	20.8	-	4.2	19
1896-1921 CONS.	32.2	17.9	17.9	32.2	0	-	0	30
LIBS.	30.0	23.3	13.3	20.0	13.3	-	0	31
1921-1948 CONS.	30.4	17.4	17.4	30.4	4.3	-	0	47
LIBS.	33.8	22.0	14.7	7.6	11.8	-	0	68
1948-1965 CONS.	44.6	5.3	10.5	31.6	7.9	-	0	38
LIBS.	36.8	18.4	7.9	23.7	10.5	-	2.6	38
CONS.	33.9	14.9	18.4	23.6	7.5	-	1.7	176
LIBS.	35.6	20.0	12.5	15.9	13.1	-	0.6	156
ALL	34.7	17.4	15.5	20.6	10.2	-	1.2	332



TABLE APPENDIX - 9

RELIGION OF PRIME MINISTER BY RELIGION OF CABINET  
APPOINTMENTS. (FIGURES IN PERCENTAGES)

Religion of Ministerial Appointees			
Religion of Prime Ministers	Catholic	Protestant	Total N in Row
Catholic	29.8	70.2	47
Protestant	36.5	63.5	282



Table Appendix - 10Occupational Data - Canada 1871 - 1901  
(All figures in Percentages)

OCCUPATIONAL CLASSES	1871 <sup>(1)</sup>	1881 <sup>(2)</sup>	1891 <sup>(3)</sup>	1901 <sup>(4)</sup>
AGRICULTURE, FISHING & LOGGING	47.5	47.6	47.2	39.38
COMMERCIAL	7.4	7.7	11.4	16.7
DOMESTIC	6.0	5.4	8.2	7.8
INDUSTRIAL	21.1	20.7	19.6	21.9
PROFESSIONAL	3.9	3.81	3.9	3.9
N.O.S.	14.2	14.8	9.68	9.8
TOTAL N IN COLUMN	1009.8	1390.8	1631.8	1905.2

(1) CANADA CENSUS, 1871, V. 2, p. 345.

(2) CANADA CENSUS, 1881, V. 2, p. 323.

(3) CANADA CENSUS, 1891, V. 2, pp. 185-91 (adapted)

(4) CANADA CENSUS, 1901, V. 4, Table 2-1 (adapted)





## TABLE APPENDIX - II

 OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTIONS CANADA 1911-61<sup>1</sup>  
 (ALL FIGURES IN PERCENTAGES)

OCCUPATION	1911	1921	1931	1941	1951	1961
PROPRIETARY & MANAGERIAL	4.7	7.3	5.6	5.4	7.4	7.8
PROFESSIONAL	3.8	5.5	6.1	6.7	7.3	9.8
AGRICULTURE FISHING & LOGGING	37.2	34.7	30.9	28.8	18.6	11.9
SERVICE	7.6	7.1	9.3	10.5	9.8	12.4
FINANCIAL & COMMERCIAL (NON PROP.)	4.7	5.7	6.1	5.9	6.6	7.6
MINING, MFG., CONSTRUCTION TPTN (EMPLOYER)	26.3	23.1	24.0	28.8	31.7	30.0
UNSKILLED LABOUR OR LABOUR N.O.S.	11.9	9.7	11.3	6.3	6.6	5.3
CLERICAL (& OTHER) MAINLY CLERICAL	3.8	7.1	6.7	7.5	11.9	15.3
TOTAL N IN COLUMN	2697.8	3143.5	3907.4	4182.3	5280.5	6458.0

1. Canada Census, 1961, VIII, Part 1, Table 3  
 (adapted and corrected)



TABLE APPENDIX - 13ETHNIC ORIENTATION OF MINISTER  
BY MARITAL STATUS  
(FIGURES IN PERCENTAGES)

Marital Status Ethnic Orientation	Single	Married	Total N in Row
English %	4.5	75.5	245
French %	4.2	95.8	88
			333





Table Appendix - 14

Family Connections in Politics by  
Ethnic Orientation and Period

Family Connections in Politics Ethnic Orientation and Period	Blood Relatives	Relatives by Marriage	Both Blood and Marriage	None	Total N in Row
1867-1896					
English	20.3	4.7	4.7	70.3	63
French	25.0	15.0	5.0	55.0	20
1896-1921					
English	15.4	8.9	0	75.6	45
French	35.7	7.1	0	57.1	14
1921-1948					
English	9.3	2.3	1.2	87.2	86
French	3.4	6.9	3.4	86.2	29
1948-1965					
English	7.6	5.7	0	86.8	51
French	25.0	4.2	0	70.8	25
English	12.9	4.8	1.6	80.6	245
French	19.5	8.0	2.3	70.1	88
All	14.6	5.7	1.8	77.8	333



## TABLE APPENDIX-15

BIRTHPLACES OF MINISTERS BY PERIOD  
& ETHNIC ORIENTATION  
(FIGURES IN PERCENTAGES)

PLACE OF BIRTH PERIOD & ETHNIC ORIENTATION	NON-URBAN* BIRTH	URBAN BIRTH	OUTSIDE CANADA	TOTAL N IN ROW
1867				
ENGLISH	57.1	12.7	30.2	63
FRENCH	81.8	18.2	0	20
1896				
ENGLISH	68.4	24.6	7.0	45
FRENCH	71.4	19.0	9.5	14
1921				
ENGLISH	66.7	18.1	15.3	86
FRENCH	74.1	22.2	3.2	29
1948				
ENGLISH	64.2	32.1	3.8	51
FRENCH	69.2	26.9	3.8	25
1965				
FRENCH of Fr. min.	75.5	22.3	2.1	88
ENGLISH	64.1	21.2	14.7	245

\*Outside of major urban centres: Victoria, Vancouver, Calgary, Edmonton, Regina, Winnipeg, Windsor, London, Hamilton, Toronto, Ottawa, Kingston, Montréal, Quebec City, Fredericton, Saint John, Halifax, St. John's.



TABLE APPENDIX - 16

LENGTH OF TIME IN PARLIAMENT BEFORE OR AFTER 1st APPOINTMENT TO CABINET BY PARTY & PERIOD  
Length of time after appointment before election  
Length of time after election before appointment

LENGTH OF PARLIAMENT. SERVICE	Never in Commons	0 - 3 Mos.	3 - 12 Mos.	Over one Year	Elected before Appointed.	N/A	Never in Commons	0 - 3 Mos.	3 - 12 Mos.	1 - 2 Years	2 - 4 Years	4 - 8 Years	8-12 Years	Over 12 Years	N/A or App. before Elect.	Total N in Row
1867- 96 Cons. Libs.	9.7 4.3	1.6 0	0 0	0 0	88.7 95.7	0 0	9.7 4.3	3.2 4.3	0 0	1.6 8.7	3.2 13.0	21.0 13.0	24.2 21.7	35.5 34.8	1.6 0	61 19
1896- 1921 Cons. Libs.	3.3 6.7	30.0 23.3	0 0	0 0	66.7 70.0	0 0	3.3 6.7	10.0 0	0 3.3	0 3.3	16.7 6.7	10.0 13.3	10.0 13.3	20.0 36.0	30.0 23.3	30 31
1921- 1948 Cons. Libs.	8.5 10.3	4.3 14.7	0 0	0 0	87.2 75.0	0 0	8.5 10.3	10.6 10.3	6.4 2.9	4.3 4.4	17.0 10.3	14.9 14.7	19.1 13.2	14.9 19.1	4.3 14.7	47 68
1948- 1965 Cons. Libs.	5.3 0	0 10.3	0 2.6	0 0	94.7 87.2	0 0	5.3 0	10.5 10.3	2.6 7.7	2.6 5.1	15.8 12.8	31.6 10.3	21.1 20.5	10.5 20.5	0 12.8	38 38
Totals Cons. Libs. All	7.3 6.3 6.8	6.8 13.1 9.8	0 0.6 0.3	0 0 0	85.8 80.0 83.1	0 0 0	7.3 6.3 6.8	7.9 7.5 7.7	2.3 3.8 2.9	2.3 5.0 3.4	11.8 10.6 11.2	19.8 13.1 16.6	19.8 16.2 18.1	22.0 23.7 22.9	6.8 13.7 10.1	176 156 332





TABLE APPENDIX - 18

TYPE OF MUNICIPAL OFFICE HELD BEFORE CABINET APPOINTMENT  
BY PERIOD & ETHNIC ORIENTATION (FIGURES IN PERCENTAGES)

TYPE OF MUNICIPAL EXPERIENCE ETHNIC ORIENTATION	NONE OR OTHER %	MAYOR OR REEVE %	CONTROLLER %	ALDERMAN %	COUNTY OFFICE %	BOARD OF EDUCATION %	TOTAL IN ROW %
1867-96 ENGLISH	76.6	17.2	4.7	0	0	1.6	63
FRENCH	75.0	20.0	0	0	0	5.0	20
1896-1921 ENGLISH	82.6	13.0	2.2	0	0	2.2	45
FRENCH	71.4	21.4	0	7.1	0	0	14
1921-1948 ENGLISH	72.1	14.0	1.2	8.1	3.5	1.2	86
FRENCH	72.4	20.7	0	3.4	0	3.4	29
1948-1965 ENGLISH	81.1	9.4	5.7	0	1.9	1.9	51
FRENCH	79.2	12.5	0	4.2	0	4.2	25
TOTALS ENGLISH	77.1	13.7	3.2	2.8	1.6	1.6	245
FRENCH	74.7	18.4	0	3.4	0	3.4	88
ALL	76.5	14.8	2.38	2.9	1.2	2.1	333



TABLE APPENDIX 19

TYPE OF PROVINCIAL LEGISLATIVE EXPERIENCE BEFORE  
APPOINTMENT TO CABINET BY PARTY & PERIOD

PROVINCIAL POLITICAL EXPERIENCE		LOWER HOUSE		CABINET		PREMIER		TOTAL N IN ROW
		NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	
PARTY & PERIOD 1867-96 CONS.	%	35.5	64.5	50.0	50.0	77.4	22.6	61
LIBS.	%	13.6	86.4	56.5	43.5	91.3	8.7	19
1896-1921 CONS.	%	63.3	36.7	76.7	23.3	90.0	10.0	30
LIBS.	%	53.3	46.7	70.0	30.0	76.7	23.3	31
1921-48 CONS.	%	76.6	23.4	91.5	8.5	95.7	4.3	47
LIBS.	%	70.6	29.4	83.8	16.2	91.2	8.8	68
1948-65 CONS.	%	84.2	15.8	94.7	5.3	97.4	2.6	38
LIBS.	%	84.6	15.4	94.9	5.1	97.4	2.6	38
TOTALS Conservatives	%	61.6	38.4	75.0	25.0	88.6	11.4	176
Liberals	%	63.0	37.0	79.8	20.2	90.0	10.0	156
ALL	%	62.2	37.8	77.4	22.6	89.3	10.7	332





TABLE APPENDIX-20

PUBLIC SERVICE EXPERIENCE BY PERIOD & ETHNIC ORIENTATION  
(FIGURES IN PERCENTAGES)

TYPE OF PUBLIC EXPERIENCE ETHNIC ORIENTATION	NONE	PROVINCIAL SPEAKER	ROYAL COMMISSION	CIVIL SERVICE OR DIPLOMAT	LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR	TOTAL N IN ROW
<u>1867-96</u> ENGLISH FRENCH	39.1 95.0	3.1 0	1.6 0	3.1 0	3.1 5.0	63 20
<u>1896-1921</u> ENGLISH FRENCH	93.5 92.4	0 0	0 0	6.5 7.1	0 0	45 14
<u>1921-1948</u> ENGLISH FRENCH	98.8 100.0	0 0	0 0	1.2 0	0 0	86 29
<u>1948-1965</u> ENGLISH FRENCH	90.6 95.8	0 0	1.9 0	7.5 4.2	0 0	51 25
<u>TOTALS</u> ENGLISH FRENCH ALL	93.6 96.6 94.2	0.8 0 0.6	0.8 0 0.6	4.0 2.3 3.6	0.8 1.1 0.9	245 88 333



TABLE APPENDIX - 21

EXPERIENCE IN NON-CABINET PARLIAMENTARY OFFICE BEFORE APPOINTMENT TO CABINET BY PERIOD AND ETHNIC ORIENTATION (FIGURES IN PERCENTAGES)

PARLIAMENTARY OFFICE HELD ETHNIC ORIENTATION	No Experience	Parl. Asst.	Speaker	Deputy Speaker	Non-Cabinet Ministry	Opp'n Leader	More Than one	Govt. Leader Senate	Speaker of Senate	Total N in Row
1867-96	English French	92.2 90.0	0 0	0 5.0	1.6 0	1.6 0	1.6 0	0 0	3.1 5.0	63 20
1896-1921	English French	89.1 71.4	0 0	0 0	0 7.1	2.2 0	2.2 14.3	4.3 0	0 0	45 14
1921-48	English French	84.9 69.0	7.0 10.3	1.2 3.4	1.2 10.3	1.2 0	1.2 0	1.2 0	0 3.4	86 29
1948-65	English French	67.9 62.5	26.4 20.8	0 0	0 0	1.9 0	1.9 4.2	1.9 0	0 0	51 25
Totals	English French All	83.9 72.4 80.9	8.0 9.2 8.3	0.4 2.3 0.9	0.8 5.7 2.1	0.8 4.6 1.8	1.6 3.4 2.1	1.6 0 1.2	0.8 2.3 1.2	245 88 333



## APPENDIX B

SOURCES AND STATISTICAL METHODS

The material used in the preparation of this report is basically from what can be termed secondary sources. The ideal method in doing a survey of this sort, especially where the population is this small, is to interview each member of the population but for obvious reasons this was impractical here. In the first place over two-thirds of the population examined is extinct and of those who are still alive most are extremely busy men by no means easily agreeable to an interview. Where the level of data gathered is uneven the figures derived from it are only as valid as the poorest source will permit and this means that all data may as well be gathered from the same type of sources. In this case the most convenient and indeed only reliable sources were the biographical dictionaries and Guides listed at the end of this Appendix together with a body of political biographies and Reminiscences published over the years since Confederation. These latter are not listed here but are footnoted throughout the study wherever they are relevant. Of the sources, the Parliamentary Guides were undoubtedly the most valuable as they cover, in more





or less detail, every minister in our survey. However when secondary sources are used it is useful to improve the reliability of data by consulting at least two sources for each member of the population. In this survey, wherever possible, all facts were doubly checked against one or more of the other sources listed here. Of these the most valuable were The Canadian Who's Who "in which no one can pay for inclusion" and H.J. Morgan's two volumes, 1898 and 1912 of Canadian Men and Women of the Time together with W.S. Wallace, Dictionary of Canadian Biography. All of the other sources listed were used frequently but they appear to be of varying degrees of reliability. Political Biographies and Reminiscences were used when necessary if facts were otherwise unavailable and in some cases recourse was had to newspapers and especially obituaries which provide very useful biographical sketches. The Ottawa Public Library maintains an obituary file but other newspaper sources are not listed here and were used only when essential.

Data on members of parliament came either from Norman Ward, The Canadian House of Commons, or from unpublished material provided by Professor R.R. March of Carleton University. Such data has been footnoted wherever it has been used.



The material on cabinet ministers was placed on a questionnaire form and from there was coded and punched on cards. Two cards were used for each minister making it essential to do most cross-correlations on a computer. The program used provided for the establishment of significance levels internally in the tables but due to the small population, 341, and the large number of cells in most tables these tests proved useless. In a sampling survey this would, of course, be disastrous but in a whole population survey where the numbers have validity in themselves and there is no question of inference to a larger population this is not a problem. The fact that it was a whole population survey and that the numbers were so small made sophisticated statistical analysis both unnecessary and indeed impossible and aside from a number of measures of central tendency in Chapter IV, none was attempted.

For the most part, throughout the work the control variables were either ethnic orientation by period or party by period. The term "ethnic orientation" is simply a convenient way of saying that any minister who was not of French-Canadian parentage or was not demonstrably representative of some other ethnic minority (and there were only five of these) was considered to be of English-Canadian ethnic orientation.





The period into which a minister was considered to fall needs some explanation. The only definition that could be made here was that he was considered to fall in the period of his first appointment. This was done for two reasons. The first was convenience, the second the fact that we are here basically concerned with the selection of Cabinet personnel and the most significant point in the minister's career for us, therefore, is when he was first selected. After that he has a prior claim to Cabinet position and the act of renewing his Cabinet position is not nearly so significant as his first selection. To provide a continuing statistical picture of constantly changing Cabinet structures by individual Cabinets would have been a prohibitive statistical task. As long as figures are expressed as percentages they are at least roughly comparable from one period to another and from one party or ethnic orientation to another in spite of disparities in the sizes of various tabulated cells.

Finally it should be remembered that in coding and punching operations of this type there is a background error simply due to human fallibility in doing the coding and punching. For this reason tables may not always balance against each



other and the numbers are not always absolutely correct. These errors are random and cannot be avoided in this type of data processing but mention should be made of them here as a precautionary measure. On occasion a slide rule was used for calculation and this will cause certain tables to not add across to 100% but in no case should the cumulative error be greater than 1%.



## STANDARD BIOGRAPHICAL SOURCES USED

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